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The Japanese Financial Reform of 1993:
Will Reform Spark Innovation?
Brian Arthur Pomper *
Introduction
On April 1 of 1993, the Japanese National Diet' implemented a wide-
ranging set of reforms to the Japanese financial system 2 that it had
adopted as the Financial System Reform Law3 almost one year earlier.
4
Various arms of the powerful Ministry of Finance (MOF)5 had been work-
* Associate, Arnold & Porter, Washington, D.C.; J.D., Cornell Law School, 1995;
B.S., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1992. This Note was submitted in October
1994.
1. AfterJapan's surrender to the Allied Forces in 1945, the Japanese legal system
was restructured primarily on an American model. Hideo Tanaka, Impact of Foreign Law
in Japan: American Law, in THE JAPANEsE LEGAL SYSTEM 245, 249 (Hideo Tanaka ed.,
1976). The Japanese National Diet, commonly referred to as "the Diet," is both the
structural and functional counterpart to the United States Congress. It is a bicameral
legislature composed of popularly elected officials entrusted with the primary lawmak-
ing power in Japan. THEJAPANESE LEGAL Sysram, supra, at 37-38. See alsoJAPAN CONST.
arts. 41-64 (explaining the structure and powers of the Diet).
2. Panel Aims to Make Finance Firms Compete More, Japan Economic Newswire, Oct.
12, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
3. Law Concerning the Realignment of Relevant Laws for the Reform of the Finan-
cial System and the Securities Trading System, Law No. 87 of 1993, translated in The
Amendment to the Securities and Exchange Law to Insure the Fairness of Securities Trading (Part
I), CAMRI RE,., Apr. 1992, at 2; The Amendment to the Securities and Exchange Law (Part
II), CAMRI REV., June 1992, at 2 [hereinafter the Financial System Reform Law].
4. Japan Ministry of Finance is Drafting Ordinances to Implement Financial Reform, 59
Banking Rep. 37 (BNA) No. I (July 6, 1992).
5. The MOF is an extremely powerful regulatory body that has the primary respon-
sibility for regulating theJapanese financial system. The Minister of Finance, a cabinet
official appointed by the Prime Minister, heads the MOF. Its powers are much broader
than any single U.S. regulatory authority, regulating substantially all private and public
financial institutions. In essence, the MOF combines the regulatory functions of the
United States Treasury, Office of Management and Budget, Internal Revenue Service,
Securities and Exchange Commission, Comptroller of the Currency, and all the state
banking and insurance agencies, as well as the supervisory functions of the Federal
Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Office of Thrift
Supervision. MAUREEN LEBLANc & ANDREW C. SvARR, THEJAPANESE FINNcLAL SYSTEM
2 (1988). Many consider the MOF to beJapan's most powerful institution. Larry Hol-
yoke, Firestorm Around the Fortress, Bus. Wit, Mar. 7, 1994, at 58.
Advisory councils are standing or ad hoc committees attached to theJapanese minis-
tries whose purpose is to research and debate issues referred to them. The councils are
composed of academics, industry leaders, journalists, and members of other groups
who have a stake in the various issues being discussed. The councils report their con-
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ing on the reforms since 1985,6 focusing on fostering competition by liber-
alizing Japan's highly specialized financial system.7 The old policy of
limiting competition to protect banks worked well when Japan was a devel-
oping nation and experiencing dramatic financial growth,8 but fundamen-
tal changes in the structure of the Japanese economy showed that reform
was needed. 9 Concurrent with these domestic structural changes, the
increasing globalization and internationalization of world economies in
general, and the Japanese economy in particular, led to calls for the liber-
alization of Japan's money markets that rose to a fever-pitch by the mid-
1980's.10
In response to these pressures, the main thrust of the reform was to
promote the efficient use of resources by increasing competition within
the Japanese financial system." However, after a series of scandals
erupted in the securities industry inJune 199112 and in the banking indus-
clusions to the ministry, and these reports often form the basis for the legislation sub-
mitted to the Diet by the ministry. See HiRosHI ODA, JAPANESE LAw 47 (1992);Yung Ho
Park, Governmental Advisory Commission System in Japan, 3 J. COMp. ADMIN. 435 (1972).
The MOF empowered three of its advisory councils to conduct deliberations on the
financial system reform: the Financial Systems Research Council (Research Council),
the Securities Exchange Council (Securities Council), and the Insurance Business
Council (Insurance Council). Elliot Gewirtz & Clark L. Taber, Fundamental Issues in
Japanese Financial System Refom,, 7 REv. BANING & FIN. SERWicS 135, 137 (1991).
6. FINANCIAL SYSTEM RESEARcH CoUNcIL, ON A NEWJAPANESE FINANCIAL SySTEM 10
(Federation of Bankers Association of Japan trans., June 25, 1991) [hereinafter
REsEARcH COUNCIL REPORT].
7. Satoshi Isaka, 6Year Debate on Financial Reform Ends: Finance Ministry Finalizes
Bills Designed to Spur Competition, NIKKEI WFL7., Mar. 21, 1992, at 3.
8. FEDERATION OF BANKERs AssOCIArION OFJAPAN (ZENGINKYO), THE BANKING SYs-
TEM IN JAPAN 3 (1989) [hereinafter THE BANKING SYSrEM]; The Big Bang, Japanese-Style,
Bus. WK., Nov. 21, 1994, at 56.
9. For instance, an extraordinarily high level of financial assets has been accumu-
lated, supported in part by Japan's perennially high savings rate, leading to excess
liquidity. Colin PA. Jones, Note, Japanese Banking Reform: A Legal Analysis of Recent
Developments, 3 DuE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 387, 406-07 (1993). This situation stands in
marked contrast to the circumstances under which the financial system had been
organized after the war, when capital-starved industries desperately needed additional
funds to promote growth. RESEARCH COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 6, at 9. The accumu-
lation of financial assets has led to a demand for more convenient and profitable finan-
cial products and services, and technological advances have enhanced the feasibility of
providing them. Id.
10. THE BANKING SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 3.
11. The Hiraiwa Committee, the government's advisory group for economic
reform, recently emphasized the need to increase competition in the Japanese financial
system by relaxing regulations separating the various sectors of the Japanese economy.
Two-Way Openings, THE BANKER, Jan. 1994, at 52. See also RESEARCH COUNCIL REPORT,
supra note 6, at 9.
12. Several of the largest and most important securities companies in Japan had
been providing improper compensation to their best corporate clients by reimbursing
them for losses incurred on the Tokyo stock exchange. Fumiko Fujisaki, Japan Panels
Rush Through Measures to Prevent Repeat of Scandals, Reuters, Dec. 3, 1991, available in
LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File. The presidents of Nomura Securities Co., Ltd.
and Nikko Securities Co., Ltd. announced on June 24, 1991 that they were resigning
amidst charges of paying improper compensation and having close ties to a large Japa-
nese crime syndicate. Fumiko Fujisaki, Japanese Scandals Could Step up Financial Reforms,
Reuters, June 27, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File. The other two
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try shortly thereafter,13 the Finance Ministry also began seeking methods
to restore flagging confidence in Japanese financial institutions.' 4 As a
result, the reform includes strengthened provisions on business informa-
tion disclosure, capital adequacy requirements, and measures to promote
competition. 15
The MOF had three main objectives in drafting the new law. First, it
sought to diversify the activities of each bank within Japan's highly special-
ized banking industry in order to allow competition and thereby promote
efficiency. 16 Second, the MOF took measures to encourage sound man-
agement of financial institutions in several ways, including allowing finan-
cial managers increased independence from the paternalistic guidance of
the MOF,' 7 reinforcing the disclosure system, and creating provisions reg-
ulating the adequacy of capitalization. 18 Third, and most importantly, the
MOF relaxed the boundary between the banking and securities industries
by allowing each to have a subsidiary competing in the other's market,
with the hope that this would promote the development of new and inno-
vative financial products and services.' 9
This last provision is the centerpiece of the new reform.20 Liberaliza-
tion of financial markets and market innovation in both Japan and the
of the so-called "Big Four" securities houses, Daiwa Securities Co., Ltd. and Yamaichi
Securities Co., Ltd. also admitted to improper compensation payments. Id.
Technically, it was not the payment of compensation that was illegal but guarantee-
ing the payment. See C. Jeffrey Char, Reforming Japan's Securities Markets: The Loss Com-
pensation Scandal, 10 INT'L TAX & Bus. Law. 173, 177 (1993). Such a guarantee is
harmful to the market because it removes corporations' incentive to invest wisely in
worthwhile stocks, since they no longer have to worry about losing money. This prac-
tice not only wastes useful capital on speculative, unproductive stock, but also keeps
that capital from being invested to support worthwhile ventures. Id. at 178. The law has
since been amended to forbid the payment of compensation as well as promises to pay.
Shoken Torihikiho [Securities and Exchange Law], Law No. 25 of 1948 (as amended),
art. 50-2 [hereinafter SEL] (copy on file with the Cornell International Law Journal). See
also Char, supra, at 194; ODA, supra note 5, at 315. For a thorough description and
analysis of the scandals, see Char, supra; David A. Sneider, Recent Deoelpments in Japan's
Securities Markets, in INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS 1993, at 345, 394-409 (PLI
Corp. Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 798, 1993).
13. High officials in Fuji, Tokai, and Kyowa-Saitama, leading banking institutions in
Japan, forged deposit certificates to serve as collateral for loans from other lenders.
International Reports, Jan. 24, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File.
14. Isaka, supra note 7, at 3.
15. RESEARCH COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 6, at 27.
16. Id. at 12-14.
17. See Two-Way Openings, supra note 11, at 53.
18. RESEARCH COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 6, at 27.
19. Id. at 20-22. See also Isaka, supra note 7, at 3 ("At a press conference after the
cabinet approved the bills, Finance Minister Tsutomu Hata said that 'the main aim of
the reform is to foster competition by lowering barriers separating different types of
financial institutions, while ensuring soundness of their management.'").
20. Isaka, supra note 7, at 3
(It is hoped that the changes will benefit customers by lowering fees for various
financial transactions and facilitating access to new financial products and serv-
ices .... The key element in the legislation is the proposed relaxation of laws
preventing banks and securities firms from crossing over into each other's field
of business.).
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United States has put banks at a competitive disadvantage vis-A-vis non-
bank financial institutions in both the deposit and loan markets.2 ' This is
a natural phenomenon when increasingly sophisticated investors with
growing sums of excess capital close their bank accounts to seek higher
interest-bearing opportunities.2 2 As a result, bank profits and capital have
declined,2 3 and banks have been unable to respond to these competitive
pressures because of restrictions on the range of permissible bank activi-
ties.24 More specifically, Article 65 of the Japanese Securities and
Exchange Law imposes a strict separation between banking and securities
activities2 5 similar to that imposed by the Glass-Steagall Act2 6 in America.
As profits waned, Japanese bankers increased pressure on the MOF to
repeal the Article 65 restriction and allow them access to Japanese capital
markets.2 7 The Financial System Reform Law responds to the bankers'
concerns by allowing mutual entry between the banking and securities
industries through the use of wholly-owned but functionally separate sub-
sidiaries. 28 In this respect, the reform is almost revolutionary29 and repre-
sents a significant step toward abolishing the wall that has prevented banks
21. Thomas F. Cargill & Gregory F.W. Todd, Japan's Financial System Reform Law:
Progress Toward Financial Liberalization?, 19 BROOK. J. INT'L L 47, 47 (1993). See
RESEARCH COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 6, at 12 ("In recent years, the fund raising of
large and medium-size corporations has shifted from bank loans to the issue of
securities.").
22. The postal savings system inJapan provides one example. TheJapanese Postal
Savings Bureau, at one time the largest deposit-taking organization in the world, was
originally established in 1875 to promote small-volume personal savings and channel
resulting funds into industrial development and modernization. DEREK F. CHANNON,
GLOBAL BANKING STRATEGY 270-71 (1988). The postal savings system has evolved to
include services that banks cannot provide, including interest rates that increase with
the term of the deposit, putting the system in competition with private financial institu-
tions. THE BANKING SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 35. With this progressive interest rate and
increased service, these accounts are more attractive to depositors than ordinary bank
savings accounts. Indeed, in the period from January to July, 1991, over four trillion
yen was transferred from banks to post office accounts, giving rise to fears that this
trend would upset the entire financial system. See Hayato Yokota, Massive Money Shift
Alarms Banks, NIKKEI WKLY., Nov. 9,1991, at 1; Clear Vision Sought for Financial ReformsJjji
Press Ticker Service, Feb. 23, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File. See
also Cargill & Todd, supra note 21, at 47-48
(During the 1980s Japanese borrowers became increasingly able to access the
Euromarkets for long-term funding, while the Japanese pension funds and
insurance companies, with ever larger reservoirs of funds to be invested in port-
folio securities, were ready purchasers of such borrowers' securities. Borrowers
found lower cost funding than that available withinJapan, cutting the banks out
in the process.).
23. Cargill & Todd, supra note 21, at 47-48.
24. From Niche to Death Trap, ECONOMIST, Apr. 30, 1994, at 12.
25. See infra part II.B.
26. See infra part II.A
27. See Fumiko Fujisaki, Japan to Allow Big Banks to Launch Securities Arms, Reuters,
Mar. 2, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
28. The Japanese adopted this structure to avoid harmful conflicts of interest
between banking and securities concerns. RESEARCH COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 6, at
21. Although it is not the only solution, the Financial System Research Council and the
Securities and Exchange Council agree in their respective reports that it is the best
solution among the alternatives. Id.; How BASIC SYSTEM REGARDING CAPITAL MARKET
Vol. 28
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from dealing in capital markets for over forty-five years.3 0
This Note will examine various aspects of the Financial System
Reform Law, focusing on the easing of Article 65 restrictions and the sepa-
rated securities subsidiaries that have been and will be established under
the law.3 ' Part I will give an overview of the Japanese financial system as it
existed before the reforms, tracking its history and evolution. Part II will
discuss the separation of commercial and investment banking in both
America and Japan, examining the historical reasons for the separation
and assessing their continued viability. Part I will critique the Japanese
banking reform and assess its likelihood of success in promoting efficiency
and creating new financial products and services by comparing the
reformed Japanese financial system with that of the United States, widely
thought to be the most creative and innovative financial system in the
world.3 2 The Note concludes that the manner in which the Japanese
reformers are implementing the changes is likely to dampen any increased
competitive pressure and lower the incentive to innovate.
I. The Japanese Financial System Before the Reform
A. The History of Japanese Banking
The Meji Restoration of 1868 transformed Japan from a primitive feudal
society led by the chief warlord, or Shogun, into a modem capitalist
nation.33 At that time, the memory of Commodore Perry remained fresh
in Japanese minds and provided a strong incentive forJapan to industrial-
ize and catch up with the Western world.3 4 Faced with the humiliating
OUGHT TO BE REFORMED, THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COUNCIL 16-18 (Capital Mar-
kets Research Institute trans., June 19, 1991). See also infra part IVA2.
29. Two-Way Openings, supra note 11, at 52.
30. The effect of the American counterpart to Article 65, the Glass-Steagall Act, has
eroded somewhat since its enactment in 1933 through judicial interpretation of the Act
and the operation of bank holding companies. See infra part IIA3. Injapan, however,
the MOF has strictly observed Article 65 since the end of World War II, keeping the wall
between the banking and securities industries impenetrable. Two-Way Openings, supra
note 11, at 52.
31. As of March of 1995, 15 new institutions have been licensed to do business as
securities subsidiaries and two more are poised to be licensed since the Financial Sys-
tem Reform Law's implementation in April of 1993. See infra notes 229-39 and accom-
panying text.
32. See Statement by John P. LaWare, Member, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance
and the Subcomm. on International Development, Finance, Trade and Monetary Policy of the
House Comm. on Banking Finance and Urban Affairs, November 20, 1991, 78 FED. REs.
BULL. 31, 32 ("The U.S. banking market, and U.S. financial markets more generally, are
the most efficient, most innovative, and most sophisticated in the world.") [hereinafter
Statement by John P. LaWare]; Jeffrey B. Tevis, Asset-Backed Securities: Secondary Market
Implications of SEC Rule 144A and Regulation S, 23 PAC. L.J. 135, 138 (1991) ("Historically,
U.S. securities markets have been recognized as the world's most innovative.").
33. THE BANKING SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 11.
34. On July 18, 1853, on orders from U.S. President Millard Fillmore, Commodore
Matthew C. Perry anchored his armed squadron at the mouth of Tokyo Bay in an effort
to open Japan to trading with the West. SAMUEL ELIOT MolusoN, THE OxFoRD HISTORY
OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 579 (1965). The Kanagawa Shogun then in power in Japan
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prospect of subjugation by these more powerful nations,3 5 Japan began to
modernize its political and social systems rapidly, relying heavily on for-
eign legal models and using law as a tool of social engineering.3 6
TheJapanese laid the foundations of their current banking and secur-
ities systems during this period. Based on an American model, the
National Bank Act of 1872 ushered in the modern era of banking in
Japan.3 7 The first securities legislation, however, the Stock Transaction
Ordinance of 1874, was modeled after the London Stock Exchange
rules.38 The Japanese established their first stock exchanges at Tokyo and
Osaka in 1878, but these were speculative and lacked a true capital market
function.3 9 Consequently, the banks, not the securities markets, financed
Japan's rapid industrialization during this period.40
From the period of modernization until the end of World War II, the
banking industry evolved into a specialized system in which financial insti-
tutions served only limited sectors of the economy rather than providing
comprehensive service. 4 ' Financial institutions were classified as either
short-term or long-term institutions, a distinction that still holds signifi-
cance today.42 From the period of modernization to the present, ordinary
banks have been the primary source of short-term commercial loans.43
During the same period, long-term financing banks, classified as "special
banks," were protected and regulated by the government to channel long-
was so impressed with the American show of power that he agreed to commence trade
with America when Perry returned to Japan in February of 1854, ending nearly 200
years of self-imposed Japanese isolation. Id.
35. See Yosiyuki Noda, ComparativeJurisprudence in Japan: Its Past and Present, in THE
JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 199 ("[W]hen [Japan] awoke from its dream
world of almost two hundred years of isolation and opened its doors to outside contact,
imperialistically-inspired Western powers were right on the doorstep.").
36. Id. See also ODA, supra note 5, at 10. Perhaps the threat of foreign domination
provides an explanation for the slogan of the rapid Japanese industrialization process
during the late 19th century: "Enrich the country and strengthen the army." Id. at 31.
37. THE BANKING SYSTM, supra note 8, at 11. Japan's first bank, the First National
Bank, was founded in Tokyo in 1873. Id. This bank underwent several transformations
over many decades, merging with the Nippon Kangyo Bank before becoming the pres-
ent-day Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank. Id. at 36.
38. Makota Yazawa, A Synopsis of Securities Regulation in Japan, inJAPANEsE SECURITIES
REGULATION 23, 26-27 (Louis Loss et al. eds., 1983).
39. Cargill & Todd, supra note 21, at 51 n.9.
40. ODA, supra note 5, at 298. In fact, non-bank financial institutions and securities
markets historically played a relatively minor role in Japan. Cargill & Todd, supra note
21, at 51. Between 1965 and 1974, nearly 80% of corporate financing was in the form
of bank loans. YOSHIO SuzuKI, THE JAPANESE FINANcIAL SYSTEM 14-16 (1989). From
1975 to 1984, the degree of bank borrowing as a percentage of total corporate finance
fell to 60% as borrowers turned increasingly to equity finance, in part resulting from
the large scale issuance of government bonds in 1975. Id.
41. Jones, supra note 9, at 389.
42. THE BANKING SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 13. The difference between these two
types of banks is simple but fundamental: long-term banks are permitted to raise long-
term funds by issuing long-term securities, such as bank debentures with five-year matu-
rities, but short-term banks are limited to a two-year limit on time deposits, their main
source of funding. Id. See also SuzuKi, supra note 40, at 36.
43. THE BANKING SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 13. Other sources of short-term loans
include sogo banks and shinkin banks. See infra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
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term funds into industry and agriculture.44 The Trust Law and Trust Busi-
ness Law of 1922 established the trust business 45 as a financial industry
distinct and separate from the banking industry, in which only trust com-
panies and trust banks could engage. 46
B. Financial Institutions in Postwar Japan
The Allied occupation of Japan after World War II brought with it many
significant changes to the Japanese financial system.4 7 In an effort to allo-
cate scarce funds to capital-starved, fledgling industries quickly during
post-war reconstruction, Japan reorganized its existing financial system
into a complicated system of small banks specializing in different areas of
the economy.48 This system ensured a stable supply of funds for each
industrial sector and helped rebuild the war-torn Japanese economy dur-
ing occupation.49 In addition, this system of separation and specialization
helped nurture financial institutions by protecting them from competition
44. THE BANKING SysrEM, supra note 8, at 13. For example, the government estab-
lished the Nippon Kangyo Bank in 1896 to promote industrial and agricultural moderni-
zation by supplying long-term loans. Id. The special bank system was abolished after
World War II. Id. at 14.
45. The trust business originally began as a business which involved managing
another person's assets for a specified purpose:
The trust business is a set of transactions in which a trust owner transfers,
through a set of legal acts (act of trust), the property rights of his own property
to another party (the trustee) and at the same time entrusts the management
and disposal of these assets to the trustee for a specified purpose (the purpose
of the trust) for the benefit of society, himself, or a third party (the benefici-
ary). In such cases, the trustee receives a transfer of assets and has the right to
manage and dispose of these assets for the specified purpose in his own name
and not in the name of the trust owner.
SuzuKI, supra note 40, at 206. Today the trust banks are most important as providers of
long-term finance. Id. at 207.
46. THE BANKING SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 15. These businesses were separated
because of concern regarding conflicts of interest. SuzuKi, supra note 40, at 38. A 1943
law eliminated the distinction between trust banks and ordinary banks, but the MOF
again separated the banking and trust businesses after the war. THE BANKING SYSTEM,
supra note 8, at 15. Although the same institution can engage in both the banking and
trust businesses, they must be managed separately. SuzuKi, supra note 40, at 207. Con-
sequently, trust banks have two sets of accounts, one for banking accounts and the
other for trust accounts. The banking accounts cover short-term finance while the trust
accounts focus on supplying funds for capital investment. SuzUKI, supra note 40, at 207;
THE BANKING SvsrEm, supra note 8, at 25. See generally SuzuKI, supra note 40, at 206-15.
47. Jones, supra note 9, at 390.
48. RESEARCH COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 6, at 9; Cargill & Todd, supra note 21, at
51 ("Banks, including various specialized financial institutions, were established to
mobilize the country's financial resources in support of industrialization and economic
growth.").
49. The Research Council explained the restructuring of the Japanese financial sys-
tem after World War II in its report to the MOF as follows:
The existing financial system was basically organized for the purpose of creating
a stable supply of limited funds for each industrial sector in the post-war era
when funds were short. This financial system supported the post-war economic
recovery and the subsequent high economic growth, making a major contribu-
tion to the economic development ofJapan.
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with one anothe °5 0 and foreign banks.5 1
In this vein, the post-war Japanese government separated the securi-
ties business from the business of banking by imposing restrictions on per-
missible banking activities similar to those contained in the Glass-Steagall
Act in the United States.5 2 Specifically, banks were prohibited from
engaging in any transactions involving the buying, selling, underwriting,
brokering, issuance, or public offering of equity securities. 55 By making
the securities business the strict province of securities firms, the govern-
ment sought to nurture and develop the Japanese securities industry and
protect it from the economic might traditionally wielded by the Japanese
banks.54
The currentJapanese financial system is still characterized by speciali-
zation and separation.55 Almost all ofJapan's finahcial institutions can be
classified into seven main categories according to their primary business
activity:5 6 1) commercial5 7 banks which focus on providing short-term
RESEARCH COUNCIL REPORT, suprfa note 6, at 12.
50. Id.
51. J. Robert Brown, Jr., Japanese Banking Reform and the Occupation Legacy: Decom-
partmentalization, Deregulation, and Decentralization, 21 DENV..J. INT'L L. & POL'y 861, 361-
62 (1993).
52. See infra part HA. Before World War II, banks could and did act as major
underwriters of public and corporate bonds but left the riskier securities transactions to
the securities companies. ODA, supra note 5, at 302-03; THE BANKING SYSTEM, supra note
8, at 16; SuzuKI, supra note 40, at 39.
53. SEL, supra note 12, art. 65.
54. Chizu Nakajima, Separation of Banking and Securities Business and the Financial
Reform Law of 1992: Creation of the 7apanese Wall'?, COMPANY LAW., June 1994, at 188;
Yoshio Suzuki, Japan Comes to Grips with Need for Financial Reform, Am. BANKER, Nov. 2,
1987, at 10. See infra part IH.B.
55. RESEARCH COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 6, at 9; THE BANKING SYSTEM, supra note
8, at 11. The separation of the banking industry according to the type of patron served
is more historical than functional at this point. SuzuKI, supra note 40, at 163. The
ordinary banks were born first, engaging in the full range of traditional banking activi-
ties, and they were followed later by special financial institutions created to service vari-
ous sectors of industry and facilitate Japanese industrialization and modernization. Id.
After this, institutions for small businesses and for trust businesses arose to address the
needs of those sectors. Id.
56. SuzuKI, supra note 40, at 163. Only the Bank of'Japan is left out of this classifica-
tion scheme. Established in 1882 as the country's central bank, it isJapan's only issuing
bank. The Bank ofJapan is a special corporation that is neither wholly private nor a
governmental entity although it is entrusted with important public duties. It fulfills a
role not unlike that of the Federal Reserve System and Federal Reserve Board in the
United States: it issues bank notes, acts as a bank for other banks and for the govern-
ment, controls credit, and implements monetary policy through adjustments in the offi-
cial discount rate and the reserve deposit requirement and by engaging in open market
transactions. See THE BANKING SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 20-22; see also FREDERIC S.
MISHKIN, THE ECONOMICS OF MONEY, BANKING, AND FINANCIAL MARKETS 388-96 (3d ed.
1992) (describing the operation of the United States Federal Reserve System).
57. The newly amended Banking Law defines "bank" as any entity duly licensed by
the Minister of Finance to carry on the business of banking, including accepting depos-
its, lending money, and engaging in exchange transactions. Banking Law, Law No. 59
of 1981 (as amended), art. 2 [hereinafter Banking Law] (unofficial translation on file
with the Cornell International Law Journao.
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finance, also called ordinary banks,58 including city banks,5 9 regional
banks,6 0 and foreign banks operating in Japan; 61 2) financial institutions
that provide long-term credit for the industrial sector, including long-term
credit banks62 and trust banks;63 3) specialized foreign exchange banks
that serve the needs of foreign exchange and trade finance, a narrow cate-
gory limited to the Bank of Tokyo;6 4 4) financial institutions that loan
primarily to small businesses, such as sogo banks,65 shinkin banks and the
Zenshinren Bank,6 6 credit cooperatives, 67 labor credit associations and the
58. Ordinary banks have played an important role in private-sector finance in Japan
since the Meiji Era. They provide the commercial sector with short-term finance in the
form of deposits, loans, and funds transfer. THE BANKING SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 23.
See also SuzuKI, supra note 40, at 170-72.
59. The 13 city banks, including the Bank of Tokyo, primarily serve large corpora-
tions and have headquarters in major Japanese cities and branch networks covering
most of the country. They are also very active in overseas markets. THE BANKING SYS-
TEM, supra note 8, at 23. The city banks include such well-known international banks as
Sumitomo Bank, Mitsubishi Bank, Fuji Bank, and Mitsui Bank. Id. app. I at 1.
60. Regional banks usually have their headquarters in the principal city of the pre-
fecture in which they are located and conduct most of their affairs. They have strong
ties with both local enterprise and local government, their main clients being small to
medium-size area businesses and private individuals. THE BANKING SYST.M, supra note 8,
at 23-24. Although the distinction between city and regional banks is insignificant
under the law, it is customary for the purposes of administration and statistics. Id. at 23.
A prefecture is a geographic division of the country usually larger than a city. In the
United States, the closest analogy would be a state within the Union. There are 47
prefectures in Japan. THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 44.
61. Foreign banks operating in Japan through a branch office are considered to be
ordinary banks under the Banking Law and are required to obtain a license for each
branch from the Minister of Finance. Eighty-one foreign banks were operating in
Japan as of March 1988. THE BANKING SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 24. See generaly SuzuKI,
supra note 40, at 196-200.
62. Long-term credit banks concentrate on making long-term loans to industry.
SuzuK, supra note 40, at 200. They can raise funds with long-term debentures but are
limited in their deposit taking. THE BANKING SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 24-25. See also
supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text. See generally SuzuKI, supa note 40, at 200-05.
63. Trust banks are long-term credit banks that also deal in the trust business. They
supply funds to major corporations as financing for capital investment. THE BANKING
SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 25. See also supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
64. The Foreign Exchange Bank Law established the Bank of Tokyo in 1954 to deal
only in foreign exchange transactions and foreign trade finance. The Bank of Tokyo
may only establish domestic branches in cities that are important centers of foreign
trade and exchange activities and cannot lend money for any activity unrelated to inter-
national trade. THE BANKING SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 24. Although the Bank of Tokyo
concentrates in the areas of foreign exchange and international finance, the city banks
also play a major role in funding these activities. SuzuKI, supra note 40, at 168.
65. Sogo banks, regulated under the 1951 Sogo Bank law, contribute to the smooth
functioning of the general economy and increasing private savings by specializing in
providing funding for small anda medium-sized businesses. SuzuKi, supra note 40, at
215. Because there is no geographical limitation on their operations and they have
gradually expanded the scope of their business activities, they have begun to resemble
city banks. THE BANKING SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 25. In keeping with their special role
as financiers ofsmall businesses, however, their clients are restricted to companies that
employ at most 300 people and are capitalized at a maximum ofY800 million. Id. at 26.
See generally SuzuKi, supra note 40, at 215-18.
66. Regulated under the 1951 Shinkin Bank Law, these banks, like ordinary and sogo
banks, are not corporations. Instead, they are non-profit cooperatives serving mainly
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Rokinren Bank,68 and the Shokochukin Bank;69 5) financial institutions that
concentrate on financing private sector agriculture, forestry, and fishery
activities, including such organizations as agricultural cooperatives, 70 fish-
ery cooperatives, 7 1 and the Norinchukin Bank; 72 6) securities companies
that operate in the securities markets, dealing in capital market and equity
financing;7 and 7) governmental financial organizations that enhance
local residents and small to medium-sized area businesses with no more than 300
employees and a maximum capitalization of Y400 million. THE BANKING SYSTEM, supra
note 8, at 26. The Shinkin Bank Law established the Zenshinren Bank as the central
institution for shinkin banks, giving it the responsibility of coordinating fund concentra-
tion within the shinkin bank system, improving investment efficiency, being a payment
intermediary for payments of public utilities and other debts, and providing low-interest
loans as a type of deposit insurance for shinkin banks in financial difficulty during local
crises to ensure solvency, among other responsibilities. SuzuKi, supra note 40, at 223-24.
See generally id- at 218-24.
67. Credit cooperatives are cooperative financial institutions founded for the
mutual benefit of their members, small and medium-sized businesses and their employ-
ees, and are regulated by the prefectural governors. Suzui, supra note 40, at 225; THE
BANKING SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 27. These organizations primarily accept deposits
from, and give loans to, members although they can loan money to non-members who
have a deposit account. Id. See generally SuzuKI, supra note 40, at 225-28.
68. Labor credit associations, or labor banks, are cooperative financial institutions
which provide financial services to increase local laborers' standards of living primarily
by accepting deposits from and loaning funds to members. THE BANKING SYSTEM, supra
note 8, at 27. They encourage the welfare activities of labor unions, consumer coopera-
tives, and other organizations that promote the interests of labor. Id. The Rokinren
Bank, also known as the National Federation of Labor Credit Associations, is the central
organization for labor banks around the country, much as the Zenshinren Bank is to the
shinkin banks. It also serves a similar coordinating role, strengthening the mutual sup-
port base of the labor banks. Id. at 28.
69. Organized under the Shokochukin Bank Law of 1936, the Shokochukin Bank is a
special corporation that provides financial services and assistance to the cooperative
societies of small to medium-sized companies. SuzuKI, supra note 40, at 230. Although
it is a private corporation, the government participates in many of its activities. THE
BANKING SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 28. See generally SUZUKI, supra note 40, at 230-31.
70. Agricultural cooperatives take deposits from, and loan funds to, their members,
mostly farmers, to promote the local farming base and living environment. THE BANK-
ING SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 29. They are unique among financial institutions in that
they are run by their members and actively participate in other businesses, including
marketing agricultural produce and purchasing equipment and materials for farming.
Id. See generally SUZUKi, supra note 40, at 235-38.
71. Fishery cooperatives serve the fishing industry and engage in the same credit
activities as agricultural cooperatives, taking deposits from, and lending to, members
but on a much smaller scale. See THE BANKING SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 30. See generally
SuzuKI, supra note 40, at 238.
72. The government established the Norinchukin Bank in 1923 to serve as the cen-
tral financial institution for cooperatives in the agricultural, forestry, and fishery indus-
tries. THE BANKING SYSTM, supra note 8, at 30. The bank plays a crucial role in
financing these industries; they usually cannot obtain financing from other sources
because of their weak collateral endowments, low profitability, and long-term or sea-
sonal demand for funds. SuzuKI, supra note 40, at 232. The Norinchukin Bank lends its
funds almost exclusively to the cooperatives and to other individuals and enterprises
either employed in or in some way connected with the agricultural, forestry, or fishery
industries. Id. at 233. See generaly ii at 232-35.
73. The Securities and Exchange Law defines the securities business as follows:
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the functioning of private financial intermediaries74 such as the Japan
Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of Japan. 75 Despite
changes in the structure and needs of the Japanese economy, this highly
rigid compartmentalization of financial business activities endured until
1993 and still persists in some manifestations today.7 6 Today, the MOF
views the system as unnecessarily protectionist and likely to hinder the effi-
cient distribution of funds.77 The Diet passed the Financial System
Reform Law to encourage competition between the various sectors of the
financial system in the hope that competition would promote the efficient
use of capital, spark the creation of innovative financial products, and
help banks develop services to serve consumers better.78
H. The Separation of the Banking and Securities Industries
As countries that legally require the separation between their banking and
a business doing any of the following acts by any person other than banks, trust
companies, and such other financial institutions as may be prescribed by a Cabi-
net order.
(1) To buy and sell securities or trade in futures of securities index, etc.,
securities options, or securities futures of foreign markets,
(2) to act as broker, agent or proxy with respect to buying and selling of
securities or trading in securities options or securities futures of for-
eign markets,
(3) to act as broker, agent or proxy with respect to orders for trades below
specified:
a) buying or selling of securities, or trading in futures of securities
index, etc., or securities options, or
b) buying or selling of securities or trading in securities futures of for-
eign markets on foreign securities markets (this refers to markets
located in foreign countries which are similar to the securities mar-
kets; the same shall apply hereinafter),
(4) to underwrite securities,
(5) to sell securities through public offering, or
(6) to handle the issuance or the sale of securities through public offering,
or to handle solicitations for an offer to acquire a security to be issued
anew which do not fall within the purview of public offering of a secur-
ity (hereinafter referred to as "private placement").
SEL, supra note 12, art. 2, para. 8. A securities company is any company that has
received a license from the MOF to engage in the securities business. Id. para. 9. See
generally Suzum, supra note 40, at 260-69. For the last 45 years, Article 65 of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Law has kept the securities and banking industries separate. See infra
part lI.B.
74. These governmental institutions provide an additional source of long-term
funds to aid in the continued industrial development and general economic develop-
ment of society. See generally Suzuu, supra note 40, at 287-96.
75. Id. at 287.
76. Far from being short of funds today, the Japanese economy has a surplus and
does not need to allocate funds through a stable distribution to key industries. Id. Yet,
strict controls on functional segmentation of the financial system remain. Id. at 35.
Few countries enforce the triple segmentation among private financial institutions that
persists in Japan: the segmentation among short-term and long-term finance, deposit
banking and the trust business, and the banking and securities business. Id. at 36.
77. RESEARCH COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 6, at 12; THE BANKING SYSTEM, supra note
8, at 6.
78. REsEARCH COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 6, at 12.
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securities industries, the United States and Japan stand virtually alone.79
In the United States, the Glass-Steagall Act8 ° stands as a barrier separating
banking from securities activities, but the barrier is not impenetrable, and
it has weakened significantly in recent years through regulatory action and
legislative interpretation. 8 1 In Japan, Article 65 of the Securities and
Exchange Law of 194882 serves a similar function, but unlike its American
counterpart, it has been strictly observed since its enactment at the end of
World War II. Although the Japanese prohibition was modeled after the
U.S. statute, 83 wholly different concerns motivated the two provisions.
The different goals sought to be achieved by the Americans and the Japa-
nese help explain important differences in their respective laws. This sec-
tion will discuss the history and philosophy of both the Glass-Steagall Act
and Article 65 and describe their operation in present-day America and
Japan.
A. The Glass-Steagall Act in the United States
1. Histoy of the Glass-Steagall Act
The Glass-Steagall Act separates the banking business from the securities
business in America:84 by preventing bankers from acting as underwriters
79. In most other countries of the world, commercial banks also serve as underwrit-
ers, brokers, and market makers, sometimes even acting as the dominant force in these
securities activities in their domestic markets. Donald E. McNees, Global Financial Mar-
ket Structure: Implications of Regulations for Competitiveness, IssUEs IN BANK REGULATION,
Fall 1990, at 2, 4; GEORGEJ. BENSTON, THE SEPARATION OF COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT
BANKING: THE GLAss-STEAcALL ACT REVISITED AND RECONSIDERED 2 (1990).
80. The Glass-Steagall Act is the popular name for sections 16, 20, 21, and 32 of the
Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 24 (1988 & Supp. III 1991); 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1988); 12 U.S.C. § 378; 12 U.S.C.
§ 78 (1988)).
81. See infra part IlA.3.
82. Article 65, entitled "Prohibition of Securities Business by Financial Institutions,"
provides that
[n]o bank, trust company and such other financial institutions as may be pre-
scribed by an ordinance of the Ministry of Finance shall do as its business any of
the acts set forth in the items of Paragraph 8 of Article 2 [supra, note 69 (acts
that define a company as a securities business)]; Provided, That this shall not
apply to cases where any bank buys or sells securities or effects securities index
futures trading, securities options trading or foreign market's securities index
futures trading pursuant to a written order received from its customer for the
account of such customer or where any bank, trust company or such other
financial institutions as may be prescribed by a Cabinet Order buys or sells
securities or effects securities index futures trading, securities options trading
or foreign market's securities futures trading for the purpose of investment or
pursuant to a trust agreement signed with its customers and for the account of
such customers in accordance with the provisions of other laws.
SEL, supra note 12, art. 65.
83. SuzuKi, supra note 40, at 39; Osamu Karihara, Recent Developments in the Securities
and Exchange Law in Japan, inJAPANESE BANKING, SECURITIES AND ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW
80-81 (Hiroshi Oda & R. Geoffrey Grice eds., 1988).
84. Sections 16 and 21 are the provisions that require the separation between bank-
ing and securities activities. Section 16 directs that
[t] he business of dealing in securities and stock by [a bank] shall be limited to
purchasing and selling such securities and stock without recourse, solely upon
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of securities and investment bankers from accepting deposits. 85 Prior to
the passage of the Act, the prevailing attitude was that, while inappropriate
for commercial bankers to enter the securities market directly,8 6 it was
perfectly ethical for them to establish business affiliates that handled
securities.8 7 In this way, bankers were able to deal in securities and partici-
pate in the investment banking business consistent with the socially estab-
lished norm. By 1930, the commercial banks were the acknowledged
industry leaders, accounting for 44.6% of all new issues.88
The commercial banks' primacy in investment banking activities was
not to last forever. The stock market crashed in October of 1929,89 and
the Great Depression followed. Public confidence in the banking system
virtually disappeared, and people withdrew their money in droves.90 By
1933, over forty percent of the nation's banks had failed or were forced to
merge, reducing the number of banks in the United States from 25,000 to
14,000.91 Congressional investigations uncovered evidence that commer-
cial bankers, in connection with their investment banking activities, com-
mitted many unethical and irresponsible acts, including forcing their
banking customers to buy unmarketable securities the banks had under-
written.92 Congress believed that commercial bank involvement in specu-
lative investments had helped cause and aggravate the stock market
decline.93
the order, and for the account of, customers, and in no case for its own
account, and the [bank) shall not underwrite any issue of securities Or stock....
Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 16, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 24,
Seventh (1988)). The statute further provides that
it shall be unlawful... for any person, firm, corporation, association, business
trust, or other similar organization, engaged in the business of issuing, under-
writing, selling, or distributing.., stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other
securities, to engage at the same time to any extent whatever in the business of
receiving deposits subject to check or repayment upon presentation of a pass-
book, certificate of deposit, or other evidence of debt, or upon request of the
depositor....
Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 21, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§ 378(1) (a) (1988)).
85. See AMERICAN BANKERs AssociAnoN, COMMERCIAL BANKING AND THE GLASS-STEA-
GALL ACT 2 (1982) ("[T]he primary thrust oftheActwas to separate investment bankers
from the deposit business, and commercial banks from.., the investment banking
business."); Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 629 (1971) ("There is no dis-
pute that one of the objectives of the Glass-Steagall Act was to prohibit commercial
banks ... from going into the investment banking business.").
86. ICI, 401 U.S. at 629 (citing Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 71 Before a Subcomm. of the
Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. 40 (1931)). Regardless, many
commercial banks still participated in the securities market directly. See AMEmacAN
BANKERS ASSOCIATION, supra note 85, at 32-33.
87. 1931 Hearings, supra note 86, at 1052.
88. AMEIucAN BANKERS ASSoCIATION, supra note 85, at 36.
89. MotusoN, supra note 34, at 940.
90. Id. at 944.
91. See BENSTON, supra note 79, at 1.
92. NICHOLAS A. LASH, BANKING IAWS AND REGULATIONS: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
126-27 (1987).
93. SeeS. REP. No. 77, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7, 9-10 (1933); CurtisJ. Polk, Banking
and Securities Law: The Glass-SteagalI Act-Has it Outlived its Usefulnessi, 55 GEo. WASH. L.
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For years after the Crash of 1929, Senator Carter Glass, author of the
Federal Reserve Act,94 sought to separate investment and commercial
banking, having concluded that commercial bank dealings in securities
were detrimental to the Federal Reserve system and responsible for the
Great Depression. 95 Despite his earnest efforts, he was unable to earn the
support necessary to effect the separation. It was not until 1933, after Con-
gressional investigations unearthed sordid details regarding commercial
bankers' investment activities and the media vilified bankers, that his pro-
posal obtained sufficient backing.9 6 On June 16, 1933, the Glass-Steagall
Act became law, and commercial banking firms could no longer engage in
investment banking activities in America.97
2. Purposes Served by the Act
Congress enacted the Glass-Steagall Act in an environment that was decid-
edly hostile toward bankers, whom Congress perceived as having caused
the Crash df 1929 and the Great Depression. The Act's stated purpose was
to prevent a recurrence of the abuses that led to those events by erecting
an impenetrable wall between commercial and investment banking
resources and activities.98 Congress believed that this measure would help
restore the shattered public confidence in America's banking system.99
In the 1971 Investment Company Institute v. Camp (ICI) decision, the
Supreme Court offered the definitive word on the reasons Congress
enacted the Glass-Steagall Act.10 0 In his opinion reaffirming the force of
those reasons, Justice Potter Stewart pointed not only to the obvious con-
cerns addressed by the Act, such as the danger that a bank would invest its
own assets in unwise stock or security investments,10 ' but also to certain
REv. 812, 812 (1987); Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co.
Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 61 (1981).
94. MoIUsoN, supra note 34, at 843.
95. BENSTON, supra note 79, at 1-2.
96. Id. at 2.
97. MOLISON, supra note 34, at 954. The Act gets its name from its principal
authors, Senator Carter Glass from Virginia, the architect of the separation between
commercial and investment banking, and Representative Henry Steagall of Alabama,
who wrote the deposit insurance provisions. BENSTON, supra note 79, at 1. Although
the Act also prohibited securities firms from engaging in the business of banking, the
history of the Act shows that it was aimed primarily at keeping commercial banks out of
the investment banking business. For a thorough discussion of the history of the Glass-
Steagall Act, see Edwin J. Perkins, The Divorce of Commercial and Investment Banking: A
Histoy, 88 BANKING L.J. 483, 505-12 (1971); Gerald T. Dunne, Glass-Steagall Act: A His-
tory of Its Legislative Origins and Regulatory Construction, 92 BANKING LJ. 38 (1975).
98. See ICi, 401 U.S. at 632 ("Senator Glass made it plain that it was 'the fixed pur-
pose of Congress' not to see the facilities of commercial banking diverted into specula-
tive operations by the aggressive and promotional character of the investment banking
business.").
99. Polk, supra note 93, at 813-14.
100. 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
101. Id. at 630. See AMERIcAN BANKERS ASsOCIATION, supra note 85, at 4-5. Because
the nation's money supply is created and held in commercial banks, there is a strong
public policy reason to ensure their health. Id. See also Cargill & Todd, supra note 21, at
59 ("[T]he policy basis for Glass-Steagall is prudential-to protect depositors' assets
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"subtle hazards" that necessarily exist whenever a commercial bank enters
the investment banking field directly or indirectly. 10 2 ' The affiliation
between a commercial and investment bank creates pressures on the com-
mercial banker that might tempt her to act counter to the best interests of
the bank depositors and inconsistently with the principles of sound bank-
ing practice. Specifically, Justice Stewart pointed to six subtle dangers that
the Glass-Steagall Act is designed to prevent:' 0 3 1) a bank's natural temp-
tation to shore up its investment banking affiliate with unsound loans or
other aid; 2) the danger that a bank would unwisely give loans to busi-
nesses in which it or its affiliates have invested; 3) the impossibility of a
bank acting as an impartial source of credit due to its interest in having
the business obtain additional funding; 4) the loss of depositor goodwill
resulting from customers losing money because of bank investment activi-
ties, detrimentally affecting a bank's reputation as a commercial bank and
undermining confidence in the banking system as a whole; 5) a bank's
temptation to loan money with the expectation that at least part of the
loan would be used to purchase stock or other securities from it; and 6)
the conflict between the promotional interest of an investment banker
with the obligation of a commercial banker to give sound, disinterested
investment advice. Justice Stewart summed up Congress' intent in passing
the Glass-Steagall Act by explaining that
Congress acted to keep commercial banks out of the investment banking
business largely because it believed that the promotional incentives of
investment banking and the investment banker's pecuniary stake in the suc-
cess of particular investment opportunities was destructive of prudent and
disinterested commercial banking and of public confidence in the commer-
cial banking system.10 4
Thus, it is clear that in passing the Glass-Steagall Act, Congress
intended to protect depositors by ensuring the safety and soundness of the
banking system in different respects. First, protecting against whatJustice
Stewart calls an "obvious danger,"10 5 the Act restricts the scope of permis-
sible bank investment to low-risk investments.' 0 6 This provision prohibits
the investment of bank funds in speculative securities which may jeopard-
against the risk believed to be inherent in bank securities ownership and trading
activities.. ").
102. 401 U.S. at 630.
103. Id. at 631-33.
104. Id. at 634. The Court quoted Senator Bulkley: "If we want banking service to be
strictly banking service, without the expectation of additional profits in selling some-
thing to customers, we must keep the banks out of the investment security business." 75
CONG. REc. 9912 (statement of Sen. Bulkley).
105. 401 U.S. at 630.
106. The Glass-Steagall Act allows a bank to purchase "investment securities" for its
own account but defines "investment securities" to be only debt securities, specifically
excluding shares of stock. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (Supp. IV 1993). The Comptroller
of the Currency's definition of "investment securities" does not include equity securi-
ties, as these are considered too risky for banks to hold. 12 C.F.R. § 1.3 (1992). See
JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, BANKING LAw AND REGULATION 175-78
(1992).
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ize the solvency of the bank, and by limiting the risk that a bank can
undertake, the Act protects against the loss of depositors' funds. Second,
as the Supreme Court's opinion in ICr makes clear, allowing commercial
banks to engage in investment banking activity might create temptations
for bankers to act contrary to the principles of sound business practice. By
segregating commercial banking activity from the investment banking
business, the Glass-Steagall Act prevents these harmful conflicts of
interest.10 7
Of course, completely separating the banking industry into a com-
mercial bank half and an investment bank half harms depositors to the
extent that competition between them would be beneficial to consumers
and the economy as a whole. There is no question that the Glass-Steagall
Act is anticompetitive: it is anticompetitive by definition. The ICI opinion
tells us that many of the hazards Congress intended to protect against by
forbidding competition were themselves anticompetitive.10 8 The "subtle
hazards" the Court points to as one of the reasons for enacting the Glass-
Steagall Act are nothing more than instances of grossly anticompetitive
behavior and interference with the natural market mechanism for the effi-
cient distribution of funds. These instances include: lending money to an
affiliate not because it is a wise business decision for the bank, but because
the affiliate is faring poorly; granting affiliates or businesses in which the
bank has invested more favorable loan terms because of the affiliation and
not because of decreased risk of loss or other quid pro quo; and loaning
money on condition that the borrower invest in securities purchased at
the bank.' 0 9 Congress considered the potential harm to depositors
incurred by preventing competition between commercial and investment
banks to be less than the harm arising from the grossly anticompetitive
behavior exhibited by commercial bankers before the Depression and sim-
ply forbade any competition at all. 110 Whether there are effective meth-
ods to deal with the problem that preserve the benefits of competition is
certainly subject to debate."' For the purposes of this Note, it is sufficient
to understand that Congress sought to protect depositors from anticompe-
107. See Franz P. Opper, Comment, in THE DEREGULATION OF THE BANKING AND
SECUrrIES INDUSTRIES 347, 347 (Lawrence G. Goldberg & Lawrence J. White eds.,
1979).
108. See 401 U.S. at 630.
109. Id. at 630-34.
110. See id. at 640
(The Glass-Steagall Act reflected a determination that the policies of competi-
tion, convenience, or expertise which might otherwise support the entry of
commercial banks into the investment banking business were outweighed by
the 'hazards' and 'financial dangers' that arise when commercial banks engage
in the activities proscribed by the Act.) (citation omitted).
Even though Glass-Steagall is anticompetitive, it is passively anticompetitive as opposed
to actively anticompetitive, i.e., its prohibition on all competition is less harmful to con-
sumers than active interference with the market mechanism in the form of favoritism or
extortion.
111. Some have argued that the Glass-Steagall Act is largely superfluous in light of
the other regulatory frameworks established after the Crash of 1929 to guard against
conflicts of interest, self-dealing, and other abuses in the securities industry. SeeWilliam
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titive behavior by forbidding competition between investment and com-
mercial banks altogether, despite losing the benefits that flow from
competition.
3. Cracks in the Glass-Steagall Wall
When enacted over sixty years ago, the Glass-Steagall Act was a strong mea-
sure that called for the complete separation of commercial and investment
banking activities. 1 2 Unforeseen advances in technology, however, have
blurred the differences between commercial and investment banks,"13 and
commercial banks are finding themselves faced with increasing competi-
tion from brokerage firms in what have traditionally been commercial
banking activities. 1 14 Bankers, constrained by the prohibitions of the
Glass-Steagall Act, have been unable to respond to these increasing domes-
tic and international pressures."15 They have sought, and in many cases
received, increased powers to engage in the securities markets.1 16 In this
manner, through legislative interpretation and regulatory action, the
Glass-Steagall wall has been crumbling for years.117
M. Isaac & Melanie L. Fein, Facing the Future-Life Without Glass-Steagal 37 CATH. U. L
REv. 281, 289-90 (1988).
Given the conditions existing when Glass-Steagall passed, with the country in the
throes of depression that was blamed primarily on the investment banking activity of
commercial bankers, the circumstances were ripe for rash overreacting. It seems non-
sensical to forbid all competition because competition leads some people to do bad
things. Why not prohibit the bad things? Why should not the goal of our regulatory
structure be to ensure the proper operation of the market mechanism while providing
appropriate safeguards? If Glass-Steagall is passively anticompetitive, would not it be
preferable to regulate actively to protect the market mechanism? Although interesting
and important, these questions are beyond the scope of this Note.
112. Perkins, supra note 97, at 524; Edward L. Symons, Jr., The United States Banking
System, 19 BROOK.J. INT'L L. 1, 29 (1993).
113. SeeLAsSH, supranote 92, at 127-28;Jonathan R. Macey, The Inevitability of Universal
Banking, 19 BRooK.J. INT'L L. 203, 204 (1993); PeterJ. Ferrara, The Regulatoy Separation
of Bankingftom Securities and Commerce in the Modern Financial Marketplace, 33 ARiz. L. REv.
583, 583-84 (1991); Joan M. LeGraw & Stacey L. Davidson, Note, Glass-Steagall and the
'Subtle Hazards" ofjudidal Activism, 24 NEw ENG. L. REv. 225, 227 (1989).
114. See Macey, supra note 113, at 226; Note, Restrictions on Bank Underwriting of Corpo-
rate Securities: A Proposal for More Permissive Regulation, 97 HaRv. L REV. 720, nn. 1-3
(1984);Joan K. Willin, Commercial Banks and the Glass-Steagall Act: A Survey of New Prod-
ucts and Activities, 104 BANKING Lj. 5, 12 (1987); Robert H. Fearon, Jr., Action Needed
from Congress to Level the Playing Fiel, AM. BANKER, Feb. 27, 1986, at 4, 6. For instance,
investment banks intruded on traditional commercial banking territory by offering
money market mutual funds and NOW accounts with check writing privileges. MACEY &
MILLER, supra note 106, at 33; MISHKIN, supra note 56, at 11.
115. Macey, supra note 113, at 226; MISHIN, supra note 56, at 291; McNees, supra
note 79, at 2-3.
116. See Symons, supra note 112, at 29; Casey K. McGarvey, Federal Regulation of Bank
Securities Activities: Will Congress Allow Glass-Steagall to be Shattered?., 12J. CoNTEMP. L. 99,
100 (1986).
117. See, e.g., Securities Industry Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
468 U.S. 207 (1984) (permitting bank holding company to acquire a discount securities
brokerage as a subsidiary); Securities Industry Ass'n v. Clarke, 885 F.2d 1034 (2d Cir.
1989) (allowing commercial banks to offer mortgage pass-through certificates).
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The Glass-Steagall Act itself contains a loophole that seems inconsis-
tent with the spirit of the Act. While section 21 of the Act contains very
strict language forbidding securities companies from engaging in banking
activity "to any extent whatever,"' 18 the language of section 20 is less
restrictive. Section 20 prohibits banks that are members of the Federal
Reserve system from being affiliated with any organization "engaged prin-
cipally" in the investment banking business."l 9 This language suggests
that a commercial bank may be affiliated with a business organization that
engages in investment banking activities which are not its principal busi-
ness.' 20 The relevant question then becomes what it means to be
"engaged principally" in the investment banking business.
In a 1978 ruling, the Federal Reserve Board allowed bank holding
companies12 ' to acquire or form subsidiaries that underwrite and deal in
certain securities, 122 known as "bank-eligible securities," that the Glass-
Steagall Act permits banks to deal in themselves.' 2 3 Years later, in 1987,
several large commercial banks applied to the Federal Reserve Board for
permission to broaden the scope of their securities subsidiaries' activities
to include underwriting and dealing in municipal bond revenues, mort-
gage-related securities, consumer receivables, and commercial paper. 12 4
On its face, this application appears to disregard Glass-Steagall's separa-
tion between commercial and investment banking blatantly. Although the
Act permits commercial banks to hold these securities as investments for
their own account, they are completely prohibited from underwriting or
dealing in them.' 2 5 But relying on the "engaged principally" language
contained in section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act, the Board approved the
applications and allowed the subsidiaries to underwrite and deal in these
"bank ineligible" securities as long as the revenue generated from transac-
118. 12 U.S.C. § 378(a)(1) (1988). See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
119. 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1988).
120. See Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S.
46, 64 (1981) ("In both the Glass-Steagall Act itself and in the Bank Holding Company
Act, Congress indicated that a bank affiliate may engage in activities that would be
impermissible for the bank itself."). For a discussion of the legislative compromise that
led to this more permissive language for affiliates, see Securities Industry Ass'n v. Board
of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 839 F.2d 47, 56-61 (2d Cir. 1988). Those banking
affiliates that trade in securities under this provision are usually subsidiaries of the bank
holding company that also holds the bank as a subsidiary. As such, they are known as
"section 20 subsidiaries." See Sneider, supra note 12, at 351.
121. A bank holding company is any company that has control over a bank. BLACK'S
LAW DicroNARY 146 (6th ed. 1990). See also 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1988).
122. 64 FED. RESERvE BULL. 222 (1978). See also 12 C.F.R. § 225.25(b)(16) (1987)
(permitting this activity).
123. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1988). These "eligible" securities include only very
low risk governmental bonds. Allowing commercial banks to underwrite and deal in
virtually risk-free government debt is perfectly consistent with the Glass-Steagall Act's
purpose of protecting depositors' funds. See supra part IIA-2.
124. 73 FED. RESERVE BULL. 473, 473 (1987). The three original banks were Citicorp,
J.P. Morgan & Co., Inc., and Bankers Trust New York Corp. A short while later, Chase
Manhattan Corp., Chemical New York Corp., Manufacturers Hanover Corp., and Secur-
ity Pacific Corp. filed similar applications. 73 FED. RESERvE BULL. 607 (1987).
125. 73 FED. REsER E BULL. 473, 473 (1987).
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tions with them did not exceed five percent (later increased to ten per-
cent)126 of the gross revenue of the subsidiary averaged over a two-year
period. 12 7 On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed this interpretation of
the "engaged principally" language in section 20 of the Glass-SteagallAct.128
The current state of the law in the United States is as follows: bank
holding companies are allowed to own both commercial banks and corpo-
rations that deal in both eligible and ineligible securities as long as the
corporation makes no more than ten percent of its gross revenue from
transactions in ineligible securities.129 Congress and the Federal Reserve
Board have adopted this restriction to limit the risk to depositors'
funds.' 3 0
The Japanese also prohibit the intermingling of banking and securi-
ties activities, albeit in a different manner and for very different reasons.
Until recently, the law in Japan did not allow banks or securities firms to
have subsidiaries that competed in the other's market, although banks
126. See 75 FED. RESERVE BULL 751 (1989).
127. 73 FED. RESERVE BuLL. 473, 485 (1987). The Board required that two additional
conditions be met: that the ineligible security underwritten by the subsidiary have no
more than five percent of the domestic market share for that particular product, and
that the subsidiary limit the amount of each type of security for dealing so as not to
violate the underwriting market share requirement. Id. at 485-86.
128. Securities Industry Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Bank-
ers Trust III), 839 F.2d 47, 67 (2d Cir. 1988). The court overturned the market share
limitations, holding that the Board abused its discretion in imposing them. Id. at 67-68.
129. Interpreting "engaged principally" as a percentage restriction seems logical, but
it defies the policy behind the Glass-Steagall Act to a certain extent. If the system is
worried about the risk to depositor funds, then it is not clear why the revenue limit is
cast as a percentage of permissible revenue rather than an absolute limitation of total
revenue that bank affiliates can earn from dealing in ineligible securities before they
violate Glass-Steagall. Interpreting section 20 as imposing a percentage limitation will
create an incentive for the affiliates to participate more vigorously in the market for
eligible securities in order to increase their total revenue so that the money amount of
the ten percent limit will be higher, thereby placing a greater amount of depositors'
funds at risk. Indeed, that appears to be exactly what bank affiliates have done. See
Symons, supra note 112, at 31.
This discrepancy appears more bizarre in comparison to the interpretation of the
language in section 32 of Glass-Steagall. Section 32 prohibits "personnel interlocks"
between commercial and investment banking firms, providing that no officer, director,
or employee of any firm "primarily engaged" in investment banking activities can con-
currently serve as an officer, director, or employee of a commercial bank. 12 U.S.C.
§ 78 (1988). The Board has held that the "primarily engaged" requirement is met in
one of two ways: if more than ten percent of the firm's gross revenue comes from
underwriting and dealing in ineligible securities, or if the gross revenue from under-
writing and dealing in ineligible securities exceeds ten million dollars, regardless of the
percentage figure. See Staff Opinion 3-939, 1 Fed. Reserve Reg. Serv. 3-389 (Dec. 14,
1981); Board Letter 3-896, 1 Fed. Reserve Reg. Serv. 3-367 (May 22, 1959). The sepa-
rate ten million dollar cap provided in the interpretation of section 32 is more consis-
tent with the purpose of protecting depositors' funds than a revenue limit dependent
upon a percentage of total revenue. To the extent that the Board should retain a limit
on commercial banks' securities subsidiary activities, it should be an absolute rather
than a percentage limitation.
130. Cargill & Todd, supra note 21, at 59.
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could own as much as five percent of the stock of a securities company.1 3 1
The Financial System Reform Law changed the Japanese financial struc-
ture, however, and moved it closer to the U.S. system.
B. Article 65 of the Japanese Securities and Exchange Law
1. History of Article 65
Before World War II, the Japanese financial system operated as a universal
banking system.132 The imperial government imposed no legal separation
between the banking and securities businesses,' 3 3 and bankers played an
important role in the underwriting of public and corporate bonds.'3 4
Fearing the risk involved in underwriting equity issues and trading in
bonds, however, the bankers left these riskier activities to the securities
firms.
1 3 5
After the war, the Japanese economy was shattered and needed to be
restructured. The Allied forces occupied Japan and helped the Japanese
government rebuild its country from the end of the war until 1951.136
Under the guidance of the General Headquarters for the Supreme Com-
mander of the Allied Powers (SCAP),13 7 the Diet drafted and adopted the
Securities and Exchange Law in 1948 (SEL), incorporating many of the
features of U.S. securities laws.' 3 8 Article 65 of the Law, based directly on
the Glass-Steagall Act, imposed a strict separation between the banking
and securities industries,' 3 9 but a variant of this separation was not wholly
131. Article 65, theJapanese equivalent to the Glass-Steagall Act, did not provide this
limitation. It came from the Japanese Anti-Monopoly Law. See infra notes 143-144 and
accompanying text.
132. Karihara, supra note 83, at 80.
133. Suzuti, supra note .40, at 39.
134. Id.; ODA, supra note 5, at 303; Karihara, supra note 83, at 80.
135. See Suzuti, supra note 40, at 39. Interestingly, the prevailing commercial bank-
ing culture in America also thought it inappropriate for commercial bankers to enter
the securities markets directly, even before the Glass-Steagall Act. See supra note 86 and
accompanying text.
136. MOiUSON, supra note 34, at 1062-65.
137. President Truman appointed General Douglas MacArthur to be the SCAP at the
end of the war, giving him complete authority over Japan and the occupation forces.
Id. at 1062.
138. SuzuKi, supra note 40, at 39; Cargill & Todd, supra note 21, at 48, 59; Yazawa,
supra note 38, at 29. The SEL covers disclosure and reporting requirements, licensing
requirements for securities companies, the scope of permitted securities for other
financial institutions such as banks, antifraud, and the establishment and operation of
the securities exchanges and regulatory structures. Sneider, supra note 12, at 354. It is
interesting to note that although the SEL has endured with modifications for over forty-
five years, the law was not passed voluntarily-the Diet passed the law under pressure
from the Occupation authorities who conditioned reopening the Japanese exchanges
on its passage. Yazawa, supra note 38, at 29.
139. Cargill & Todd, supra note 21, at 48. Some commentators argue that, in prac-
tice,Japanese banks have been able to underwrite corporate debt by acting as advisor to
the issuing corporation and assuming the default risk if the issuing company becomes
insolvent. Although such an agreement is illegal under Article 65, it is enforceable as a
moral rather than a legal obligation. As such, it does not violate Article 65. See Litt et
al., Politics, Bureaucracies, and Financial Markets: Bank Entry into Commercial Paper Under-
writing in the United States and Japan, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 369, 381 (1990). Although this
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unknown in Japan before the war. Japanese banks would underwrite pub-
lic and corporate bonds, but they voluntarily excluded themselves from
certain more risky securities activities 140 even though it was not required
by law. While the SEL was based on the Glass-Steagall Act, it also codified
the prevailing banking custom of the period.141
2. Purpose of Article 65
The General Headquarters for SCAP officially stated that the policy
behind Article 65 was the same policy that motivated the passage of the
Glass-Steagall Act-to protect bank depositors from the risks inherent in
trust institutions engaging in securities activities. 142 However, at least two
considerations seem to belie this explanation. First, unlike American
banks, Japanese banks are free to purchase stocks and other equity instru-
ments as investments for their own account1 43 and can invest without con-
sidering the degree of risk. Japan's Anti-Monopoly Law provides the only
limit to banks' holdings by prohibiting them from owning more than five
percent of another company's shares. 144 If Article 65 was truly intended
to protect depositor funds, then it, like the Glass-Steagall Act, would pro-
hibit bank investment in speculative securities. In addition, the major
securities companies in Japan combine the functions of underwriter, bro-
ker, and dealer,145 an arrangement that is rife with conflict of interest.
For instance, a securities company could underwrite a new offering and
then advise its brokerage customers to purchase them. It seems unlikely
that a regulatory structure that tolerates such a blatant conflict of interest
would concern itself with the "subtle hazards" of mixing banking and
securities activities. 146
activity may not be trivial, it obviously is insufficient from the banks' perspective or they
would not have pushed for reform of Article 65 so strongly. In addition, to the extent
that it does occur, this phenomenon will almost certainly diminish with the increasing
globalization of financial markets and the attendant competition. See, e.g., Louis Tur-
ner, Japan Suffers in the Slump, INT'L MGMrr., Mar. 1994, at 30, 31 ("There are clear signs
that competitive pressures are starting to erode some of the more distinctive Japanese
practices.").
140. SuzuKi, supra note 40, at 39. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
141. SuzuKI, supra note 40, at 39.
142. Id.; Cargill & Todd, supra note 21, at 59.
143. Suzuiu, supra note 40, at 40 ("Article 65 ... places no controls whatsoever on
the acquisition of securities and equities for investment purposes."); Nakajima, supra
note 54, at 188. American corporations are limited to purchasing marketable debt
instruments which are thought to be very safe investments nearly indistinguishable
from an outright loan. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
144. Sneider, supra note 12, at 357; Law Relating to Prohibition of Private Monopoly
and Methods of Preserving Fair Trade, Law No. 54 of 1947, (as amended), art. 11, para.
1, reprinted in Law Relating to Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Methods of Preserv-
ing Fair Trade ofJapan, 2 LAw Buu. SERIESJAPAN (EHS) KA1, 15 (1987) [hereinafter
Anti-Monopoly Law].
145. ODA, supra note 5, at 302.
146. A persuasive argument could also be made that protecting depositors' interests
could not have been the rationale behind the adoption of Article 65 because it was not
needed for this purpose, since bankers refrained from dealing in certain risky invest-
ments, giving the securities companies a monopoly over those functions. In that man-
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In fact, the true force motivating the enactment of Article 65 seems to
have been the desire to cultivate a domestic securities industry free of
competition from the larger and better established banking sector.14 7
This purpose is perfectly consistent with the separation and specialization
that characterized Japanese finance in the years following the war.14 8 The
Japanese restructured their economy so as to revive particular sectors of
industry by providing a system of banks to serve only that industrial sector.
Separating the financial system in this manner displayed an enormous
amount of skepticism in the long-term benefits of competition, which is
perfectly understandable given the short-term goal of rebuilding Japan.
Rather than concerning themselves with the efficiency gains to be made by
pitting financial institutions against one another, the Japanese sought to
protect each of the financial institutions and thereby protect and develop
each industrial sector.149 In typical Japanese style, financiers and bankers
worked hand in hand with industrialists to rebuildJapan: an arrangement
of cooperation rather than competition.
Japanese officials felt that a well-developed securities market was nec-
essary to rebuild Japan into a modern industrialized nation. For that rea-
son, they structured their economic system so as to protect the securities
markets from the traditional dominance of the zaibatsu banks engaged in
underwriting. 150 In this manner, Japanese officials hoped that the securi-
ties firms could raise the equity capital desperately needed by new busi-
nesses in Japan, thereby helping to rebuild and strengthen the economy.
They also hoped that the securities firms would simultaneously become
stronger and better able to raise equity capital for future businesses. 15 1
ner, depositors' funds were shielded from risky activities. See Suzuiu, supra note 40, at
39.
147. Id.; Cargill & Todd, supra note 21, at 60; THE BANKING SYSTEM, supra note 8, at
16.
148. SeeJones, supra note 9, at 390 n.18 ("[M]ost of the laws that established the
specialized banks . . . were passed between 1947 and 1954."). See also supra notes 47-77
and accompanying text.
149. One could argue that the individualJapanese was less concerned with long-term
financial gain through the protection of the economy than in rebuildingJapan. Much
more so than citizens of other countries, and certainly more so than Americans, the
Japanese people view themselves as engaged in the cooperative enterprise of advancing
Japan's interest as a whole rather than their own individual interests separately. One
could conceivably argue that Americans, too, are concerned with advancing the inter-
ests of America as a whole, but we have chosen a different method. So great is our faith
in competition that we believe the most efficient and productive method to advance the
interests of the country as a whole is for each of us to advance our own individual
interests.
It is probable that the Japanese government either made the policy decision to
forego efficiency gains in a competitive system or did not think about efficiency at all
when restructuring the economy. Individuals, on the other hand, saw in the plan a way
to make an enormous amount of money in the short run by engaging in protected and
sheltered financial activity with a captive consumer base whose financial success was
virtually ensured by the government.
150. Nakajima, supra note 54, at 188. See also infra note 203.
151. Nakajima, supra note 54, at 188. In fact, although the securities firms and the
equity markets grew by leaps and bounds during the rapid growth of the Japanese econ-
omy through the 1950s and 60s, the equity markets did not provide the needed capital
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The strategy worked, and today, the securities firms in Japan rank among
the largest and most powerful companies in the country. 15 2 It would
seem, then, that the original rationale for separating the banking and
securities industries has weakened considerably since the end of World
War II. 153 As the rationale has weakened, the pressure to lower the
boundary between the two industries has increased.
3. Cracks in the Article 65 Wall
As the Japanese accumulated financial assets in the high-growth period
following World War II, they became increasingly sensitive to the profit-
ability of their investments. 154 When the demand for capital diminished,
the Japanese had the luxury of "shopping around" for the most profitable
investments. 15 5 Borrowers found lower cost funding, and investors earned
higher rates of return outside of Japan. 156 At the same time, Japanese
companies began depending more heavily on equity finance and commer-
cial paper rather than loans, 157 which cut into banks' profit margins. Con-
sequently, the banks lost a significant share of their traditional deposit and
quickly enough or in sufficient quantity. As a result, bank lending remained the pri-
mary source of capital for business. Id. In fact, it was not until the demand for capital
decreased and theJapanese economy slowed its growth that the banks lobbied for entry
into the securities markets. See infra notes 154-60 and accompanying text.
152. Today, Nomura Securities is the largest securities firm in the world with a mar-
ket value in excess of $50 billion. MISHIN, supra note 56, at 289. To put the size of the
Japanese securities firms into perspective, the smallest of the "Big Four," Yamaichi
Securities, is over five times larger than Merrill Lynch, the largest U.S. firm. Id. See also
J. Mark Ramseyer, Legal Rules in Repeated Deals: Banking in the Shadow of Defection in
Japan, 20J. LEGAL STUD. 91, 99-100 (1991); Frances Rosenbluth, The Political Economy of
FinancialReform in Japan: The Banking Act of 198Z 6 UCLA PAC. BASIN LJ. 62, 68 (1989).
One commentator has argued that Congress actually passed the Glass-Steagall Act for
the same reason that the Japanese enacted Article 65, which was to benefit investment
bankers as a special interest group. SeeJonathan R. Macey, Special Interest Groups Legisla-
tion and the Judicial Function: The Dilemma of Glass-Steagall, 33 EMORY LJ. 1 (1984).
153. In April of 1986, the city banks officially requested that the MOF review Article
65 of the SEL, arguing that it had more than fulfilled "its initial purpose of fostering the
sound growth of Japan's securities industry...." See Masaru Mabuchi, The Politics of
Financial Deregulation in Japan: The Concept of Apolitical Pact, 37 OSAKA U. L REv. 1, 15-16
(1990).
154. Id. at 7-8; Jones, supra note 9, at 405.
155. RESEARCH COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 6, at 9 ("The accumulation of financial
assets has been accompanied by a demand for more diversified and sophisticated finan-
cial products and services."); i at 13.
156. David G. Litt, Work in Progress at the Ministry of Finance: Proposals for Restructuring
the Japanese Financial Services Industry, 12 U. PA.J. INT'L Bus. L. 711, 719 (1991);Jones,
supra note 9, at 405-06; Mabuchi, supra note 153, at 15-16; RESEARCH COUNCIL REPORT,
supra note 6, at 9
(In the environment of internationalization of economy and advancement of
financial techniques which facilitate the vigorous international flow of capital,
corporations are now able to determine in which markets to invest and to pro-
cure capital, strictly based on such factors as profitability of the financial prod-
ucts offered in the world markets and the convenience of each market.).
157. Japan's Bankers Breach the Wall, EcoNOMIsT, Nov. 26, 1994, at 85 ("[I]nJapan as
elsewhere, firms have found that raising capital by issuing bonds and shares is cheaper
than borrowing from banks.").
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loan markets to securities firms at home and abroad.' 58
Alarmed by this trend, the banks began pressuring the MOF to allow
them to engage in a broader range of securities transactions,' 5 9 believing
that their ability to offer a wider array of services would help them retain
profits and compete effectively internationally. 160 The securities industry,
for its part, worried that the banks' strong relationships with corporate
Japan and their large branch networks would make it difficult for them to
compete with the banks for underwriting and retail brokerage business. 16 1
Balancing these concerns, the MOF amended the Banking and Securities
Laws in 1981 to allow banks to deal in public bonds and sell them over the
counter and again in 1988 to permit banks to trade public bond options.
The MOF stopped short, however, of allowing banks to engage in retail
stock brokering, the securities firms' most profitable business and the pri-
mary business of the smaller securities firms.' 6 2
Throughout the 1980s, the barriers between the banking and securi-
ties industries slowly eroded. Japanese banks were permitted to establish
securities affiliates outside the country even though they competed with
domestic Japanese securities firms for overseas underwriting business. 163
Even in securities activities considered outside the reach of the banks, the
banks profited indirectly by becoming affiliated with securities firms
through mutual stock ownership.'6 Nevertheless, the banks still sought
to expand their underwriting actitivies further by seeking relaxation of the
Article 65 restrictions. 165 After years of deliberation and research begin-
ning in 1985, the MOF responded with the Financial System Reform Law
of 1992.
I. The Financial System Reform Law of 1992 and Innovation
A. Provisions of the Reform
1. The Reform in General
The reform's central goal was to liberalize the Japanese economy by
encouraging competition between financial institutions, thereby benefit-
ingJapanese consumers. 166 The system of specialization and protection of
Japanese financial institutions had served the purpose for which it was
originally established: Japan had been rebuilt. Almost fifty years had
passed since the end of World War II, and the Japanese had developed the
158. See THE BANKING Ssr.Mm, supra note 8, at 4-5; Cargill & Todd, supra note 21, at
47-48; Litt, supra note 156, at 719-21; Rosenbluth, supra note 152, at 68-71. See also supra
notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
159. Mabuchi, supra note 153, at 9-10.
160. Litt, supra note 156, at 720; Rosenbluth, supra note 152, at 70-71.
161. Litt, supra note 156, at 721.
162. RESEARCH COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 6, at 17; Litt, supra note 156, at 721.
163. Sneider, supra note 12, at 357. The MOF refused to allow the securities affiliates
to lead manage domestic Japanese issues. Id.
164. Id.
165. Litt, supra note 156, at 721.
166. RESEARCH COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 6, at 9.
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second largest economy in the world.' 67 The system's rigidity had become
a burden, restricting financial institutions' ability to produce innovative
financial products and services. 16 8 Since each specialized institution dealt
exclusively with a particular business area, there was little need for innova-
tion to attract new business. In addition, various restrictions and customs
arising out of the vertical division of the Japanese financial system stifled
the development of new financial products and services. 169
To encourage competition and thereby promote innovation, the Japa-
nese reformers sought to ease the boundaries that had separated their
specialized financial institutions for years, allowing them to enter one
another's turf.' 70 They began to phase out the distinction between long-
term credit banks, ordinary banks, and trust banks. The Financial System
Reform Law broadened cooperative financial institutions' scope of activi-
ties to make them almost indistinguishable from ordinary banks and col-
lapsed the distinction between long-term and short-term credit by allowing
ordinary banks to deal in long- and medium-term loans. Most impor-
tantly, the reform allowed banks and securities firms to compete with one
another in their respective areas of traditional dominance.
The main concern about abolishing the distinction between the dif-
ferent types of banks was their varying sizes.' 7 ' The city banks are by far
the largest of all the Japanese banks and have the most extensive branch
network. The reformers believed that the city banks' status as interna-
tional banks gave them a tremendous advantage over the other types of
banks, to the extent that the smaller banks might have difficulty compet-
ing with them following a wholesale deregulation. To deal with this situa-
tion, the reform allowed the banks to enter into new business fields only
through the operation of separate subsidiaries and empowered the MOF
to determine the degree of control parent banks were to exercise over
these subsidiaries. 172
2. The Separated Subsidiary Approach
Both the Research Council and the Securities Council examined several
options regarding the lowering of the barrier between the various finan-
cial sectors, including the banking and securities industries. They consid-
ered using a piecemeal approach-a case-by-case easing of restrictions.
This had been the response of choice by the Japanese government in the
167. The Big Bang, Japanese-Style supra note 8, at 56.
168. RES.ARCH COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 6, at 9; id. at 14 ("Under the existing
vertical division system, which limits the range of products and services each financial
institution can handle, it is difficult for financial institutions to take advantage of tech-
nological innovations and to meet the diversifying needs of the financial user.").
169. Id. ("[E]ven if a new product is developed involving multiple financial sectors,
its offer to the user tends to be restrained since this gives rise to confrontation between
the sectors, chiefly concerning the problem of specifying the providers of the
products.").
170. Id. at 10.
171. The reformers continually speak of the necessity of "achieving a level-playing
field." Id. at 20.
172. Id. at 20-21.
Cornell International Law Journal
past.173 This time, however, the reformers considered this response to be
too disorganized and removed from actual reform to be worthy of imple-
mentation. 17 4 It would also have required expensive and difficult inquir-
ies into the intricacies of particular circumstances. In essence, a case-by-
case reform would have been less of a reform and more of an ongoing
negotiation between financial institutions about the scope of their busi-
nesses. 175 The reformers, however, were seeking to enhance competition,
not to create a process which involved compromise, coordination, and
accommodation.
A proposal to introduce universal banking to Japan was at the other
extreme. Under a universal banking system, all financial institutions
would be allowed to engage without restriction in all types of financial
transactions. Many countries, including Germany, France, and Italy, have
this type of financial system.' 76 The system is efficient because it permits
the consumer to complete all desired transactions in one location from
one provider.' 77 In addition, it allows financial institutions to diversify
their operations, thereby decreasing risk and enhancing stability.178
While universal banking has many advantages, there are many problems
associated with allowing expansive financial power to rest in one entity.
Foremost is the creation of difficult conflicts of interest as financial institu-
tions begin to operate in a variety of roles. 179 The Financial System
Research Council thought that the introduction of universal banking was
too radical for this reform, but it did not rule it out for the future.18 0
The Japanese also considered structuring their financial system
exactly like the U.S. financial system, with holding companies owning sev-
eral financial institutions from various sectors.' 8 1 However, because in
Japan holding companies are illegal under Article 9 of the Anti-Monopoly
Law, this suggestion was not feasible without further legislative reform,
and "it [was] not considered appropriate to seek a revision of that law for
the sake of financial system review alone."' 82 A viable alternative, how-
ever, was the multifunctional subsidiary which would allow securities com-
panies and banks to enter one another's markets through the
establishment of wholly-owned subsidiaries that would be able to enter
173. Yoichi Miyazawa, Financial System Reform in Japan: Separation of Banking and Secur-
ities Business, in INTENArTIONAL SECUnrIS MARKETrs 233, 246-47 (PLI Corp. Law and
Practice Course Handbook Series No. 743, 1991).
174. Jones, supra note 9, at 413.
175. Litt, supra note 156, at 725.
176. Helen A. Garten, Universal Banking and Financial Stability, 19 BROOK. J. INT'L L.
159, 159 & n.3 (1993).
177. Litt, supra note 156, at 725.
178. Garten, supra note 176, at 161.
179. RESEARCH COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 6, at 21. For an excellent discussion of
other problems with introducing universal banking in Japan, see Litt, supra note 156, at
725-26.
180. Miyazawa, supra note 173, at 250.
181. See supra notes 118-129 and accompanying text.
182. RESEARCH COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 6, at 21; Miyazawa, supra note 173, at
248-49.
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into a range of new activities, much like a universal bank.'l 3 The subsidi-
aries would be restricted to the capital markets or to activities other than
deposit-taking. In this manner, large companies would enjoy the effi-
ciency advantages of universal banking while consumers would continue
to benefit from the safety of the existing system, since all new activities
would be confined to the subsidiary.' 8 4 The Japanese thought that such
an approach had a synergistic advantage and would promote balanced
competitive conditions in the financial markets. 18 5
Although the multifunctional subsidiary approach obviated the need
to legalize holding companies, Article 11 of the Anti-Monopoly Law
presented a problem since it forbids companies from owning more than
five percent of the outstanding shares of another company's stock.' 86
Thus, the multifunctional approach would require either amending Arti-
cle 11 or granting exemptions to financial institutions that wished to estab-
lish subsidiaries. Despite the potential benefits such a system would bring,
it was not adopted for many of the same reasons the universal banking
system was not adopted, including the possibility of harmful conflicts of
interest.187
In order to capture the advantages of the multifunctional subsidiary
approach while avoiding the disadvantages, specifically the potential for
conflicts of interest, the reformers adopted a separated subsidiary
approach. Under this approach, financial institutions must establish a sep-
arate subsidiary for each new field of business they wish to enter (hence
the term "separated subsidiaries") with each subsidiary able to operate in
only one financial market. In order to enter the securities business, banks
could establish securities subsidiaries-corporations wholly owned by the
banks and engaged in activities as a securities company. Likewise, to
engage in the banking business, securities firms could establish banking
subsidiaries. Conflicts of interest are diminished by confining the differ-
ent types of financial activity to separated subsidiaries. This structure
would also provide strong continuity with the existing system and increase
competition in any given financial sector.'8 8 Because the parent institu-
tion owns 100% of the subsidiary, the separated subsidiary approach raises
concerns regarding the ownership limitation contained in Article 11 of
the Anti-Monopoly Law. 189 Rather than amend Article 11 to cover all sep-
arated financial subsidiaries, the Japanese opted for case-by-case exemp-
tions to the Article 11 limitation, to be granted by the Japanese Fair Trade
Commission. 19 0
183. Jonathan R. Macey, The Inevitability of Universal Banking, 19 BROOK. J. INT'L L.
203, 221-22 (1993).
184. Litt, supra note 156, at 727.
185. RESEARCH COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 6, at 21.
186. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
187. RESEARCH COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 6, at 21.
188. Litt, supra note 156, at 728.
189. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
190. RESEARCH COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 6, at 22.
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Japanese lawmakers adopted the separated subsidiary approach on
the recommendation of both advisory councils and the MOF. The new
law is contained in amended Article 65-3 of the Securities and Exchange
Law. Article 65-3, entitled "Securities Business Conducted by a Financial
Institution Through a Subsidiary," succinctly states the essence of the
reform:
The provisions of Article 65 shall not preclude the Minister of Finance from
issuing a license [to engage in the securities business] ... to a joint stock
company in which a bank, trust company, or such other financial institution
as may be prescribed by a Cabinet order owns a majority of its shares.19 1
While the reform enables banks to compete against the securities firms,
the new law basically keeps Article 65 intact. No bank may engage in the
securities business directly, but they will be able to profit from the securi-
ties dealings of their wholly owned subsidiaries.
B. Financial Innovation
The American financial system is generally considered to be the most
dynamic and innovative system in the world.' 9 2 Many things Americans
now take for granted were the recent products of financial innovation,
including credit cards, automated teller machines, money market mutual
funds, and variable interest rates. 193 While much has been written about
the stimuli for and beneficial effects of financial innovation, 194 one thing
is clear: financial innovation occurs because the innovator is trying to
make more money. 19 5 This is classic economics-all market participants
are assumed to be rational actors, and rational actors always attempt to
maximize their financial positions. They will, therefore, do whatever they
can within the applicable constraints, such as law and morality, to increase
their total wealth. Participants in capital markets buy and sell financial
products and services, and the seller offering the most attractive financial
product or service stands to make the most money. What would be consid-
ered the most attractive financial product or service depends upon many
things: market conditions, the needs and desires of market participants,
applicable laws and regulations, and the tax structure, to name a few.
Through the process of creating and marketing new financial products
191. SEL, supra note 12, art. 65-3.
192. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
193. James A. Baker III, Foreword to Symposium, New Financial Products, the Modern
Process of Financial Innovation, and the Law, 69 Tax. L. RLv. vii, x (1991).
194. See, e.g., Timothy A. Canova, The Transformation of U.S. Banking and Finance: From
Regulated Competition to Free-Market Receivership, 60 BROOK. L. Rxv. 1295 (1995); Samuel
Wolff, Recent Developments in International Securities Regulation, 23 DENv. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 347 (1995); Michael Occhiolini, Where to Draw the Line: Distinguishing between
Restricted and Publicly Registered Securities in an Era of Equity Swaps, 1 STAN. J. L. Bus. & FIN.
209 (1995); Jerry W. Markham, Regulation of Hybrid Instruments under the Commodity
Exchange Act: A Call for Alternatives, 1990 COLUM. Bus. L Rxv. 1 (1990); Barry W. Taylor,
Derivative Product Activities of Commercial Banks, in SwAPs AND OTHER DERIVATIVES IN 1993
(PLI Corp. Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 815, 1993).
195. See MISHKIN, supra note 56, at 297 ("[I]nnovation is produced by the desire of
individuals and businesses to maximize profits.").
Vol 28
1995 Japanese Financial Reform of 1993
and services, a financial innovator can tailor the attributes of his innova-
tion to make it more attractive to consumers than those already in exist-
ence or those likely to be marketed by rivals. The nature of the innovation
depends upon the market pressures that sparked the innovation in the
first place. Finally, many types of stimuli prompt financial innovation,
including changes in legal and regulatory rules, taxes, technological
improvements, increased efficiencies in collecting and processing infor-
mation, and extreme interest rate fluctuations.19 6
The desire to avoid existing regulations that hinder profits is a very
strong motivating force for financial innovation.' 9 7 For instance, the
United States Banking Act of 1933 prohibited the payment of interest on
checking accounts.' 9 8 If a bank could somehow figure out a way to pay
interest on checking accounts legally, it would attract more customers and
increase profits, because all other banks were prohibited from doing so.
In fact, in 1970, a Massachusetts bank discovered that in order for an
account to be a checking account the depositor must have the legal right
to demand withdrawal of her funds immediately. By withholding that
legal right to withdraw on demand but recognizing it in practice, the
account was functionally indistinguishable from a true checking account,
and the bank was able to pay interest on the account. In this way, NOW
(negotiable order of withdrawal) accounts were born.199
196. See, e.g., Sean Becketti, The Role of Stipped Securities in Portfolio Management, ECON.
REv., May 1988, at 20 ("A wave of new financial products has been generated in recent
years by the combined pressures of increased financial market volatility, technological
innovation and regulatory change."); Shenker & Colletta, supra note 194, at 1370. See
also Mabuchi, supra note 153, at 8-9 (describingJapanese banks' introduction of certifi-
cates of deposit, or CDs, to circumvent interest rate regulation).
197. See Richard C. Aspinwall, On the "Specialness" of Banking, 7 IssuEs IN BANK REG.
16, 19 (1983) ("Incentives to develop new instruments or new ways to process old
instruments invariably stem from the burdens of regulation applying to established
arrangements or institutions."). One commentator has described this process of finan-
cial innovation resulting from attempts to avoid regulation as "loophole mining."
EdwardJ. Kane, Acceerating Inflation, Technological Innovation, and the DecreasingEffective-
ness of Bank Regulation, 36J. FrN. 355, 355 (1981). Innovations that result from a desire
to avoid regulations usually will have the effect of eliciting new regulations, and sellers
will, in turn, innovate in order to avoid those new regulations. See MISHIN, supra note
56, at 311 ("Just as financial institutions change in response to regulation, the regula-
tory authorities change their regulations in response to financial innovation. This pro-
cess can be thought of as a cat-and-mouse game between the financial institutions and
the regulators in which they adapt continually to each other.").
198. MACEy & MILLER, supra note 106, at 30-31. This prohibition was abolished in the
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
199. MISHIN, supra note 56, at 309. Another way to avoid the restriction on paying
interest on checking accounts is to keep all of the depositor's funds in a savings account
earning interest, electronically transferring exactly the amount of a check to be cashed
just at the moment the check is cashed. Technically, interest is being paid only on the
savings account, but functionally the account is a checking account. Id. at 310.
Similarly, commercial paper evolved at the end of the eighteenth century to fill the
gap between available and demanded credit in many parts of the United States, particu-
larly in the South and the West, where there was a relatively low concentration of banks
providing needed credit for rapidly growing areas of the country. Because American
banks were limited to operating within one state at best, and one branch at worst, credit
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Examples of innovation stemming from a desire to avoid regulation
can be found in 'many other countries. After World War II, the Japanese
Diet enacted the Anti-Monopoly Law200 in an attempt to break up the
powerful zaibatsU2 0 1 Although the Law outlawed holding companies, a
new system of headless corporate groups known as keiretsu evolved to take
their place. 20 2 A keiretsu is a group of companies, centered around a main
bank, that mutually own one another's shares within the limit imposed by
the Anti-Monopoly Law.20 3 A keiretsu can therefore be seen as a form of
zaibatsu modified to fit under the strictures of the Anti-Monopoly Law.
They developed because the Japanese preferred to work in a zaibatsu-like
system rather than the anti-monopolistic American system imposed upon
Japan after the war. Therefore, Japanese companies formed these innova-
tive keiretsu groups to circumvent the Anti-Monopoly Law.20 4
Increased interest rate risk will also spark innovation of products
designed to decrease that risk.20 5 At the same time, advances in technol-
ogy lower the cost of providing new financial services and therefore make
the process of financial innovation easier.20 6 There are two underlying
processes that strongly influence financial innovation. The first, which has
already been mentioned, is that innovation occurs because of a desire on
the part of the innovator to make more money. The second, which is
inherently related to the first, has been implicit in our discussion but has
yet to be explicitly articulated: competition breeds innovation because
other competitors are also trying to make more money.
For illustrative purposes, assume that the market is a zero-sum
game-what one seller makes, another loses. 20 7 Competition is not abso-
did not flow readily from one part of the country to another. Selling commercial paper
allowed companies to circumvent this restriction and created a nationwide credit mar-
ket. See Litt et al., supra note 139, at 377.
200. Anti-Monopoly Law, art. 11, para. 1; see supra note 144 and accompanying text.
201. The zaibatsu were large conglomerates controlled by wealthy families that domi-
nated the industrial structure in pre-World War IIJapan. The American analogs would
be industrial monopolies. They were outlawed after the War because they were
anticompetitive. See Cargill & Todd, supra note 21, at 51, 54-55.
202. Id. at 55.
203. ODA, supra note 5, at 359-61.
204. See Litt et al., supra note 139, at 380 (arguing that "the old zaibatsu have man-
aged to knit together business alliances, called keiretsu, and retain many of their pre-
war relationships on an informal basis.").
205. MISHKIN, supra note 56, at 298-302.
206. See Association of Data Processing Serv., Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 697 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("[S]cientific innovation in the fields of
electronics and telecommunications... possess[es] a peculiar capability to destroy the
categories of enterprise upon which regulation is based."); Almarin Phillips, Commen,
in THE DEREGULATION OF THE BANKING AND SECURrrIES INDUSTRIES 351, 353 (1979)
("Glass-Steagall, ... the regulation of asset portfolios, restrictions geographically and by
service on asset transfers just cannot be effective in the new technological environ-
ment."); RESEARCH COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 6, at 9.
207. Of course, this is a simplifying assumption. While it is true that each individual
transaction is a zero-sum game, markets inevitably grow or shrink as consumers are
either drawn from or exit to other markets, and the sum total wealth in the world is not
constant. However, for the purposes of this discussion, the assumption is a reasonable
one to make.
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lutely necessary for financial innovation to occur-a monopolist might still
innovate in order to avoid regulations or taxes-but competition is a pow-
erful spark to innovate.20 8 Innovation is driven not only by the desire for
increased profits, but also by increased competition since increased com-
petition leads to innovation in an attempt to compete more effectively and
thereby increase profits. The operation of these two concepts in conjunc-
tion, competition and the desire to maximize profits, leads to financial
innovation.
There are three important principles to understand when analyzing
competition and its effect on financial innovation. First, the greater the
competition, the greater the pressure for innovation.20 9 This flows natu-
rally from our discussion. Because the market is a zero-sum game, compe-
tition decreases profits and increases the pressure for innovation.
Competition is highly effective in kindling innovation because a successful
new product created to compete with another seller's product will
heighten the competition and motivate the competitor-seller to produce
another innovative product.2 10
Second, the greater the number of market participants, the greater
the competition. 21 ' Because the market is a zero-sum game, profits
decrease as the number of market participants increases.2 12 When profits
decrease, competition will increase as firms fight to regain their profit
margins. Therefore, the greater the number of market participants, the
greater the pressure for innovation.
208. See Willin, supra note 114, at 5 ("The necessity for diversifying and remaining
competitive with other financial services institutions, the desire to increase fee-based
income, and the need to respond to new customer demands for choices and options
are some of the reasons banks have developed new securities-related products.").
209. See Financial Services Competitiveness Act of 1995, Hearing Before the House on Bank-
ing and Financial Services, 104th Cong., 21 (Feb. 28, 1995) ("[T]he one thing we have
learned is that the more competition in financial services as indeed elsewhere, the bet-
ter it is for consumers, because the types of products which we now have in finance are
really quite extraordinarily more useful [and] sophisticated .... .") (statement of Alan
Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors), available in LEXIS,
News Library, CURNWS File.
210. See Howard H. Newman, Comment, in THE DEREGULATION OF THE BANKING AND
SECURIEs INDUsTRIES 341, 341 (1979) ("[S]hort-term credit was traditionally provided
by banks through their loan facilities. To service their clients' short-term credit needs,
brokers countered by pioneering and promoting the commercial paper market. Banks
in turn have introduced below prime-rate borrowing facilities to recapture a portion of
this demand for short-term funds."); Mabuchi, supra note 153, at 8-9 (describing banks'
introduction of CDs in response to competition from the securities sector and its effect
of increasing competition between banks and securities companies).
211. It is easy to imagine circumstances under which havingfewercompetitors would
increase competition, such as when two or more small firms merge to form a large firm
with greater competitive potential than the sum of that of its components individually.
We are concerned, however, with the general case of market entry, not competitive
merger.
212. SeeAsako Ishibashi, Subsidiaries of Big Banks Bow in as Securities Brokers Competition
Intensifies in Bond Transactions, NIKKEI WKLy., Nov. 28, 1994, at 18 ("The more crowded
and competitive the market becomes, the thinner the profit margins are likely to be for
all competitors.").
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Third, because market participants often have varying backgrounds,
experiences, and resources, they each bring different perspectives and
ideas to the marketplace. They use their ingenuity to create products bet-
ter than those already in existence and better than those they think their
rivals can produce. Their ingenuity, however, is necessarily a function of
their backgrounds and experiences, so different participants will innovate
in different ways. This is an important point to understand-the same
stimulus will produce different innovations since any problem can be
solved in a myriad of ways. This is a desirable result because consumers
will benefit from having a choice of financial products and services, rather
than just one. Different consumers will prefer different solutions, but the
consumers get to make that choice-they can choose the financial prod-
ucts and services which best fit their individual needs.2 15
With these principles in mind, we can now examine the Japanese
financial system reform to determine whether the substance and imple-
mentation of the reforms will promote the creation of new and innovative
financial products and services as the reformers hoped it would. 214
C. Will the Reform Lead to New and Innovative Products and Services?
By relaxing Article 65, the Japanese are seeking to encourage those inno-
vations that would arise from the increased competition between the
securities and banking industries for the same funds.2 15 The Japanese
hope that increased competition will cause banks and securities firms to
introduce more convenient and efficient financial products and services in
order to attract business away from their new competitors. 2 16 The ques-
tion becomes whether the changes the Japanese have made to their finan-
cial system in the Financial System Reform Act will produce the desired
effects.21 7 In other words, will the newly fashioned financial system result
213. Clearly this is a desirable result. Imagine a group of consumers who each
purchase a particular product because it generally fits his or her needs. If there was
another product with different characteristics that would perform the same function,
some of the group of consumers would begin purchasing the new product in lieu of the
old if they found its characteristics more desirable. Necessarily, the overall purchasing
satisfaction of this group of consumers has increased. Taken to its logical extreme,
each consumer would then have a custom-designed product.
214. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
215. The separation between the banking and securities industries is itself a regula-
tion that has given rise to a pressure to avoid its operation. See Phillips, supra note 206,
at 352 ("Walls [between investment and commercial banking] can of course be
erected-as the Maginot Line was-only to invite flights over or invasions around it.");
Newman, supra note 210, at 341-42 ("[W]ithout Glass-Steagall, it is difficult to imagine
what form of economic pressures would have caused lending institutions to develop
commercial paper. . . ."); MISHmN, supra note 56, at 293.
216. RESEARCH COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 6, at 9 ("It is now necessary to reform the
existing system and encourage competition between the different categories of finan-
cial businesses based on the idea of offering financial products and services of better
quality to the Japanese people through further competition.").
217. The mere fact that the securities industry has been separated from the banking
industry in Japan cannot provide a satisfactory explanation for the lack of new financial
products and services. For example, the banking and securities industries are also sepa-
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in more competition between banking and securities firms?2 1 8
Interestingly, while the Japanese pledge that their reform goal is to
promote competition as a vehicle for sparking innovation, they appear to
take back with one hand what they give with the other. Although the
reforms are nominally intended to encourage competition, both their sub-
stance and their implementation display a distrust of competition and
bode poorly for the future of Japanese financial innovation.
1. Implementing the Reform
The problem with the reform is fundamental: it is not really deregulation
at all. Rather, it is a re-regulation.2 19 The Diet has granted the MOF an
enormous amount of discretionary power over the reform's substance.2 20
Articles 16(2) and 16(3) of the amended Banking Law indicate that the
MOF has the power to determine which firms can form subsidiaries, which
firms can be acquired as subsidiaries, and in which types of transactions a
firm and its subsidiaries can engage. 22 ' Additionally, since a bank must
apply to the Japanese Fair Trade Commission for permission to own stock
in a company in derogation of the Anti-Monopoly Act,2 2 2 the MOF has
rated in America, and the world regards the United States as the well-spring of financial
creativity. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
218. This is the only question we need to answer. If the reforms do indeed result in
more competition, this will increase the pressure for and ultimately lead to innovation.
219. Yuichi Shono, a general manager at the Bank of Tokyo, quipped
"[d] eregulation is happening in a very regulated way." The Big Bang Japanese-Style; supra
note 8, at 56. See also Henny Sender, Japan's Not-So-Mighty Banks, INsTrruTIONAL INVES-
TOR, Nov. 1990, at 74 ("To MOF officials the very term 'deregulation' sounds ... too
messy... ; they prefer 'rationalization' or 'consolidation' or even 'reregulation.'").
220. Cargill & Todd, supra note 21, at 81 ("Uapanese regulators have] sought to
guide the direction, and control the speed, of liberalizations as much as possible.").
The text of the newly amended banking law clearly illustrates the overwhelming degree
of control the MOF retains over the pace of liberalization:
ARTIcLE 16-2 A bank may, with the approval of the Minister of Finance,
acquire and own more than 50 percent of the total number of shares outstand-
ing (limited to those with voting rights) of a securities company, trust bank, or
other bank (limited to those banks prescribed by ordinance of the Ministry of
Finance) ....
Aincii 16-3 A parent bank may not deal in the following transactions or,
engage in the following conduct with its subsidiaries, etc ..... or customers (in
the case the Minister of Finance determines the transaction or conduct to be
necessary for the public interest, this section shall not be applicable):
1) transactions with subsidiaries, etc., in which the terms and conditions
are determined to disadvantage the interests of the parent bank in light
of the ordinary terms and conditions of the bank's transactions;
2) transactions or conduct with its subsidiaries, etc., or with customers
related to subsidiaries, etc., prescribed by ordinance of the Ministry of
Finance as threatening to the parent bank's sound and proper business
operation.
Banking Law, supra note 57, arts. 16(2), (3) (as amended by the Financial System
Reform Law) (translation by author).
221. Banking Law, supra note 57, arts. 16(2), (3) (as amended by the Financial Sys-
tem Reform Law) (translation by author).
222. See supra notes 188-89 and accompanying text.
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even more power to police the operation of the reform and to control
competition. The discretionary power delegated to the MOF to control
the pace and extent of reform is consistent with the general tendency in
Japan "to give governmental agencies a predominant role in the enforce-
ment of law."'223 One commentator has even suggested that far from
being the liberalizing deregulation it had been touted as being, the Finan-
cial System Reform Act could be a "brilliant maneuver by the MOF" to
regain its dominance in the field of financial regulation after recent scan-
dals and other concerns have diminished its prestige.2 24
The MOF's position, known as the "soft-landing" policy,2 25 is that the
reform should proceed gradually, taking account of the currently poor
market conditions and the likely drastic effect on smaller securities firms
caused by increased competition in the securities business.2 26 The Japa-
nese government wants to give the country's beleaguered brokerage
houses a chance to recover from the Tokyo market collapse before expos-
ing them to potential competition from banks' subsidiaries. 227 The MOF
is accomplishing this goal in two ways: by staggering the start dates of the
banks' entry into the securities business and by limiting the scope of their
securities subsidiaries' permissible business activities to dealing in corpo-
rate and government bonds.
The MOF has staggered entry into the securities business by allowing
banks to establish securities subsidiaries in stages. IBJ Securities, LTCB
Securities, and Norinchukin Securities, subsidiaries of the Industrial Bank
of Japan, the Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan, and the Norinchukin
Bank, respectively, were the first to enter the market on July 26, 1993.228
Although the MOF intended to keep the powerful city banks from estab-
lishing securities subsidiaries until after the entry of other participants,
Daiwa Bank acquired the ailing Cosmo Securities in a bailout plan
announced on August 13, 1993, and has been operating in the securities
markets since then.229 The MOF approved the takeover as "an extraordi-
nary case," giving Daiwa a lead over the other city banks in entering the
securities field in return for rescuing the debt-ridden, second-tier securi-
ties company.230 Mitsubishi Trust and Banking and Sumitomo Trust and
Banking both established securities subsidiaries in September 1993, and
223. Hideo Tanaka & Akio Takeuchi, The Role of Private Persons in the Enforcement of
Law: A Comparative Study ofJapanese and American Law, in THE JAPANEsE LEcAL SYSTEM,
supra note 1, at 331, 334.
224. Jones, supra note 9, at 435.
225. See MOF Set to Allow Tokyo Banks to Enter Trust Business by Summer, 64 Banking
Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 237 (Jan. 30, 1995).
226. Toshihiro Maeda, ed., Tokyo, 4J. BANKING & FIN. L. & PaAc. 140, 140 (1993).
227. Robert Thomson, Japan to Slow Banks' Stock Market Move, FIN. TIMEs, Dec. 17,
1992, at 4.
228. Hijiri Inose, Bond Bust Slams Bank Securities Units: Three New Companies May Suffer
Losses Under Rules Curtailing Equities Trading, NImKI WKLY., Apr. 4, 1994, at 16.
229. Anthony Rowley, The Return of Universal Banking, Bus. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1993, at 6.
230. Bank Acquisition of Brokerage Delivers Major Blow to Japanese "Glass Steagall" Inter-
national Securities Regulation Report, Aug. 24, 1993, available in LEXIS, News library,
CURNWS File.
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Yasuda Trust and Banking's securities subsidiary began operations in June
1994.231
The MOF allowed Asahi Bank to be the first of the city banks to estab-
lish a securities subsidiary in July 1994.232 The MOF selected Asahi Bank
because it was thought to be weaker than the other city banks and there-
fore less competition for the securities industry.23 3 The MOF did not
allow other city banks to enter the securities field until November 24,
1994, when it allowed six to enter. On that date, DKB Securities, Sakura
Securities, Fuji Securities, Mitsubishi Diamond Securities, Sanwa Securi-
ties, and Sumitomo Capital Securities, subsidiaries of Dai-Ichi Kangyo
Bank, Sakura Bank, Fuji Bank, Mitsubishi Bank, Sanwa Bank, and
Sumitomo Bank, respectively, began their operations.2 3 4 The MOF issued
a license to Tokai Bank's securities subsidiary, Tokai International Securi-
ties, on February 6, 1995,235 and Hokkaido Takushoku Bank is expected
to establish its securities subsidiary in the spring of 1995,236 making it the
ninth major commercial bank to establish a securities subsidiary.23 7 Mit-
sui Trust and Banking has already announced its plans to set up a securi-
ties subsidiary to begin operations on April 1, 1995.238
In an effort to protect the small securities firms that rely heavily on
retail stock brokering for the majority of their business, 239 the MOF has
limited the scope of the new securities subsidiaries' permissible activities.
Specifically, the subsidiaries have been denied access to the equities mar-
ket-they are not allowed to engage in securities brokering.24° To protect
existing brokerages, the subsidiaries' activities will be limited to underwrit-
ing and brokering government and corporate bonds.241 Allowing banks'
securities subsidiaries to deal in the bond market will increase the compe-
231. Mitsui Trust to Set Up Securities Subsidiary, Jiji Press Ticker Service, Jan. 5, 1995,
available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
232. Six More City Banks Establish Brokerage Subsidiaries in Japan, 63 Banking Rep.
(BNA) No. 21 at 847 (Dec. 5, 1994).
233. Hijiri Inose, Head Start Seen No BigLift forAsahi Bank Securities Unit: Unclear Strat-
egy, Bond Slump to Hurt Debut of First City Bank Securities Subsidiary, NiKKEi WsLY., March
14, 1994, at 12.
234. City Banks' Securities Subsidiaries Open for Business, Fin. Reg. Rep., Nov. 1994, avail-
able in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
235. MOFLienses Tokai Bank Securities Subsidiary,Japan Econ. Newswire, Feb. 6, 1995,
available in LEXIS, News Library, GURNWS File.
236. MOF Set to Allow Tokyo Banks to Enter Trust Business by Summer, 64 Banking Rep.
(BNA) No. 5, at 237 (Jan. 30, 1995).
237. It will actually be the tenth city bank to operate in the securities business via a
subsidiary. Since Daiwa acquired a subsidiary in an emergency bailout plan, it is unnec-
essary for Daiwa to establish its own. See supra notes 231-32 and accompanying text.
The Bank of Tokyo has decided to concentrate on the trust business, having established
a trust bank subsidiary in October 1993. City Banks to Crack Broker's Hold in 3 Stages, Jifi
Press Ticker Service, Mar. 2, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
238. Mitsui Trust to Set Up Securities Subsidiay, Jii Press Ticker Service, Jan. 5, 1995,
available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
239. Litt, supra note 156, at 721.
240. City Banks to Crack Brokers'Hold in 3 StagesJ~i Press Ticker Service, Mar. 2, 1994,
available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
241. Ishibashi, supra note 212.
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tition faced by the largerJapanese brokers, but it will have a limited com-
petitive impact on the smaller brokers who deal primarily in stocks.242
2. Anaylyzing the Implementation
To determine the reform's likely impact on the Japanese financial system,
we can examine the reform according to the three principles developed
above.243 First, the MOF is seeking to encourage financial innovation in
its domestic market. To accomplish this, the MOF must ensure a substan-
tial amount of competition in the Japanese financial sector. To encourage
competition, the Japanese reformed their securities and banking laws to
allow banks and securities companies to compete with one another
through the operation of separated subsidiaries. Unfortunately, however,
the manner in which the Japanese introduced reform to their financial
system defeats the main goal of the reform. 244 The MOF argues that it
must proceed slowly to lessen the impact on the market.2 45 This is a
rather odd situation: the MOF hopes that the increased competition
between the banks and securities companies will produce innovative finan-
cial products and services, but the MOF is introducing the reform in such
a way that minimizes any resulting competition.246
The MOF is trying to control competition by allowing certain firms to
gain access and become entrenched in the market before other competi-
tors enter.247 Without allowing substantial competition, there will be no
incentive for the financial sector to innovate to attract customers. Innova-
tion in financial products and services is one method a firm can use to
gain a competitive edge over another, and early entry into the market is
another. To the extent that the MOF is succeeding in diminishing compe-
tition by allowing early entry, there will be less pressure for financial
innovation.
Second, the greater the number of firms the MOF allows into the
securities business, the greater competition there is likely to be. The Diet
has given the MOF the authority to choose those banks that may establish
subsidiaries in the securities market and when they may begin operations.
Thus, the MOF is allowed to admit a few new entrants, observe the effect
the new entrants have on the market, and then decide whether and when
to admit additional entrants. Of course, the MOF's exercise of this power
could not be more at odds with its stated goal of increasing competition
242. Thomson, supra note 227, at 4.
243. See supra notes 209-14 and accompanying text.
244. See Michael Hirsh, It's Bankers Versus Brokers As Japan's Glass-Steagall Starts To
Break Down, INsTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Apr. 1993, at 25, 25 ("The ever cautious Ministry
of Finance has every intention of keeping the competition orderly and limiting the
crossover between industries.").
245. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
246. The reformers have constantly spoken of the need "to maintain a level playing
field." Japan's Big Bang, Fin. Reg. Rep., Nov. 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library,
CURNWS File.
247. A major securities house official stated that "[blanks already in the securities
business, in particular the Industrial Bank ofJapan, have been trying hard to establish
their market share before we join." Fujisaki, supra note 27.
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among the various financial sectors. "Managed competition" will not
result in the competitive environment that the MOF supposedly sought to
create. To facilitate competitive pressures that will lead to innovation, the
MOF must let the market dictate entry. By preserving its ability to dictate
who enters the market and when, the MOF is supplanting the market
mechanism with administrative guidance.
In addition to regulating the number and timing of new entrants, the
MOF has severely limited their scope of permissible operations, essentially
splitting the securities industry into those companies that deal in bonds
and those that deal in stocks. The banks' securities subsidiaries are strictly
limited to dealing in corporate and government bonds:248 they are pro-
hibited from handling equities. 249 In effect, then, there will be no new
entrants into the equity market and no effect on competition. This is
exactly what the MOF intended. It specifically included this limitation to
protect the smaller securities firms from any increase in competition. This
slow change was very frustrating to the banks who wanted increased free-
dom for their securities subsidiaries to engage in a wider range of activi-
ties.250 Meanwhile, the securities subsidiaries are very anxious to enter the
equity business as well.25 ' Unless the MOF allows the natural competitive
market forces to operate, it will not see the innovation that it desires.
Since the new securities subsidiaries are limited to corporate bond
underwriting, low bond prices could have a profound effect on the willing-
ness of banks to establish subsidiaries when they do get MOF approval,
slowing the process of reform. For instance, the first three securities sub-
sidiaries had been doing well, benefiting from the strong bond market
that lasted until late 1993, but they have begun to lose money since bond
prices started to plunge in earlyJanuary 1994.252 The MOF stipulated that
subsidiaries must be profitable by 1997 in order to acquire approval, 253
and with long-term interest rates on the rise since early 1994, making a
248. Rowley, supra note 229, at 6. Although limited in their activities, the securities
subsidiaries have been active in those areas of operation permitted them. In February,
1994, IBJ Securities lead a syndicate of underwriters as lead manager for a Y 20 billion
straight bond issue of Nissan Motor Co. Yuzo Saeki, Bank Securities Units Make 1st Bid to
Undemrrite Government Bonds, Nia _r WiuLv., Apr. 11, 1994, at 13.
249. City Banks to Crack Brokers'Hold in 3 Stages,Jjji Press Ticker Service, Mar. 2, 1994,
available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
250. Michael Hirsh, Why Sanwa Leads the Pack, INSrrrtrroNAL INVESTOR, Feb. 1994, at
155.
251. City Banks File SweepingDeregulation Request,Jii Press Ticker Service, Nov. 4, 1994,
available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File; Rika Otsuka, Japan Banks' Securities
Arms Say Have Advantages, The Reuter Asia-Pac. Bus. Rep., Dec. 1, 1994, available in
LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File. Sanwa Securities president Toshiharu Ukegawa
said, "We can't meet our clients' needs fully as long as we can't enter the equities busi-
ness .... We want to be able to deal in equities as soon as possible." Id.
252. Inose, supra note 233. As of the end of September 1993, IBJ Securities posted Y
400 million (U.S. $3.8 million) of pretax profits and Norinchukin Securities posted Y
100 million (U.S. $950,000). LTGB Securities announced pretax losses of Y 100 million
(U.S. $950,000). Id.
253. Ishibashi, supra note 212.
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profit on bond trading will not be an easy feat.25 4 The difficulty in turning
a profit by 1997 may deter banks from making the substantial investment
in capital and trained personnel required to open a securities subsidiary.
The MOF has chosen to forbid banks who want to enter the securities
business from purchasing existing securities houses.255 Banks that wish to
have a securities subsidiary, therefore, must establish one themselves. 25 6
This is expensive and difficult to do, especially when the subsidiaries'
operations are limited only to dealing in unprofitable corporate and gov-
ernment bonds. This restriction will certainly limit the pool of banks with
securities subsidiaries to those larger banks able to afford the expense of
establishing a new subsidiary during an economic downturn. Therefore,
there are fewer potential market participants and a lower degree of mar-
ket competition.
Third, the greater the diversity of market participants' backgrounds,
the greater the variety of innovations. Banks have the expertise, resources,
and talent to make their subsidiaries competitive in the securities mar-
kets. 257 But the large banks likely to be able to afford to establish new
securities subsidiaries all serve large institutional clients. To the extent
that they deal in the same businesses with the same type of customers, they
all bring a similar background to the market. This similarity will decrease
the variety of innovative products likely to be created in the coming years.
As a final consideration, with the Japanese economy in the grips of its
worst recession in years, the reform hardly comes at an auspicious time.
Many bankers are less than enthusiastic about the prospect of being
allowed to compete in a stagnant securities market.25 8 Given the rapid
decline in the bond market since January 1994,259 along with the current
limit on the securities subsidiaries' area of activity, it seems likely that
bankers will be cautious before investing in costly equipment, real estate,
and personnel needed to establish a securities subsidiary. Thus, poor eco-
nomic conditions will further slow the entry of additional participants into
the market, again lessening competition and, therefore, the pressure to
innovate.
254. Id. (quoting Minoru Suzuki, president of Sakura Securities).
255. This is in contrast to the financial deregulation in London in 1986, known as
the "Big Bang," in which commercial banks wanting to become members of the stock
exchange were permitted to buy existing members. Japan's Big Bang, supra note 246.
256. Id. The MOF made an exception to this policy when it allowed Daiwa Bank to
acquire Cosmo Securities in a bailout transaction in August 1993. See supra note 229-30
and accompanying text.
257. Elaine Lies, Japan's Big Four Brokers "Mostly Stable" - Moodys, The Reuter Asia-
Pac. Bus. Rep., Nov. 30, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File; Hirsh,
supra note 244, at 25.
258. See Fumiko Fujisaki,Japanese Reforms Don't Spell Free Competition, The Reuters Bus.
Rep.,June 19, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File ("Even big securi-
ties houses are reluctant to establish new banking subsidiaries since they are increas-
ingly cost-conscious after more than two years of stock market depression."); Japanese
Savings: Safe as Post Offices, EcoNoMIs-r, Dec. 26, 1992, at 104 ("[Banks] are no longer in
a hurry to enter the securities business, which is conspicuously unprofitable these
days.").
259. See Inose, supra note 233.
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3. Comparison with the United States
The structure of the Japanese reform, which allows commercial banks and
securities firms to enter one another's business areas through the opera-
tion of separated subsidiaries, is probably the best way to proceed. In a
hearing regarding the repeal or substantial revision of the Glass-Steagall
Act in America, Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board
of Governors, stated his belief that a section 20 subsidiary of a bank hold-
ing company,260 analogous to a Japanese separated subsidiary, is the best
framework to allow banks to enter the securities field.26 1 Nevertheless, the
implementation of the reform and the degree of discretion the MOF exer-
cises in determining whether and when a bank subsidiary can enter the
securities business leaves much to be desired from the standpoint of
increasing competition.
It is true that in the United States, banks that want to establish section
20 subsidiaries have to apply to the Federal Reserve Board and have their
applications approved on a case-by-case basis. In the context of the Ameri-
can system, however, this is completely reasonable. Commercial and
investment banking in the United States were not separated by the Glass-
Steagall Act to prevent competition between them or to cultivate an
independent investment banking industry to protect the interests of the
securities firms. The Glass-Steagall Act separated commercial and invest-
ment banking to protect the interests of depositors. Keeping this in mind,
it is manifestly reasonable to expect that the Federal Reserve Board would
scrutinize every application to protect depositors' interests. However, in
the Japanese context, where the initial purpose of separation was to pro-
tect against competition, to dismantle a competitive restraint in such an
anticompetitive manner only intensifies the result.
While it is perhaps true that a modest amount of reregulation is desir-
able to prevent economic turmoil,2 62 the MOF has absolute control over
entry into the market. As long as the MOF gives banks the advantage of
staged entry, they will not have to develop more efficient products and
services to attract customers. Staged entry is acceptable to the extent nec-
essary to avoid financial chaos, but it will make competition in the market-
place less fierce and thereby dampen the drive for innovation.
The primary factor that makes U.S. financial markets as innovative as
they have been is not the structure of the U.S. financial system. A persua-
sive argument could be made that a different structure would lead to
greater efficiencies and perhaps enhance innovation. 263 The explanation
for the high degree of financial innovation in the United States is the fact
that financial firms in the United States face extremely fierce competition.
In contrast, a major characteristic ofJapanese finance ever since its incep-
260. See supra notes 118-130 and accompanying text.
261. Financial Services Competitiveness Act of 1995, Hearing Before the House Banking and
Financial Services Comm., 3 (Feb. 28, 1995), available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS
File.
262. Phillips, supra note 206, at 353.
263. See generally Macey, supra note 113.
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don in 1868 has been the predominant role played by negotiated rather
than market transactions. 264 Unlike the Japanese, whose private participa-
tion in the equity markets has been wholly lacking, Americans have always
been very active in the equity markets. The Japanese have traditionally
relied on banks for funding.265 Also, the U.S. banking market is the most
open to foreign competition 2 66 while Japanese markets are notoriously
closed to foreign competition.
Structural similarity with the U.S. system will not give the Japanese
financial system innovative drive. Only the degree of competition that the
reform injects into the system will determine whether and what innovation
will result. Even though the reform is better than the status quo, the
implementation of the reform is misguided, since it softens the competi-
tive blows to market participants. Nevertheless, there are several positive
points to make regarding the reform.
4. Benefits of the Reform
Unquestionably, the changes that have been made are a positive step
towards increasing competition in the Japanese financial markets. 2 67 The
new securities subsidiaries are intent on developing new products to com-
pete more effectively against the established securities firms and against
one another. 268 The competitive pressure, however, may not be sufficient
to stimulate enough innovation to become or to remain profitable.
Regardless of how much competition the new financial system structure
fosters and how much innovation this in turn produces, lowering the bar-
rier between the banking and securities business will have definite bene-
fits. Liberalization will allow the introduction of new, but not necessarily
innovative, investment products, such as asset-backed securities, securi-
tized loans, and money market funds, previously forbidden by the com-
partmentalized structure ofJapan's financial system.269
264. See Cargill & Todd, supra note 21, at 49-50.
265. SeeJAMES C. ABEGGLEN & GEORGE STALKJR., Kaisha, The Japanese Corporation
150 (1985).
266. See Statement by John P. LaWare supra note 32, at 32 n.32 ("The U.S. banking
market, and U.S. financial markets more generally, are the most efficient, most innova-
tive, and most sophisticated in the world. It is not a coincidence that our markets are
also among the most open to foreign competition.").
267. Japan: Rules on Options, Futures, Swaps, Global Financial Markets, Dec. 14, 1994,
available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File ("[Allowing banks to establish securities
subsidiaries] will enhance competition in the securities market .... ."); Otsuka, supra
note 251 ("'Since banks started to set up securities units .... [t]ension in the (bond)
market seems to have increased in a healthy way.'") (statement by Yasuo Noda, presi-
dent of DKB Securities Company).
268. City Banks' Securities Units Present Potential Power Shift: 5 New Subsidiaries Entering
Sector As Firms Step Up Securities-Related Financing, Nmii WKLY., Oct. 31, 1994, at 16.
269. Emiko Terazono, Investment Innovations on Horizon in Japan, FiN. TIMES, Feb. 14,
1992, at 21 ("Growth ofJapan's asset-backed securities market has been stunted by Arti-
cle 65 of the Securities and Exchange Act.... ."). Institutional investors were reluctant
to invest heavily in asset-backed securities because they were not categorized as securi-
ties. Id.
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Another subtle benefit of allowing additional securities subsidiaries to
enter the securities field may be the effect of attracting additional business
to the Tokyo Stock Exchange, which suffers from low trading volume.2 7 0
Securities subsidiaries will give banks a stake in developingJapan's stunted
corporate bond market.27 1 In fact, when the securities subsidiaries of six
large Japanese commercial banks entered the bond market on November
24, 1994, the morning volume doubled its usual levels, and bond traders
welcomed them with open arms.272 The subsidiaries themselves hope to
be able to expand the market overall, rather than merely stealing the
established firms' business.2 73 If they are able to expand participation in
the capital markets, there will be more business to go around, and all com-
petitors will benefit.
Established securities brokers fear that the subsidiaries will steal a
great deal of their bond underwriting business by taking advantage of
their parent banks' strong ties with corporate clients.274 For example, in
December 1994, Sakura Securities joined the underwriting syndicate for a
Y 10 billion straight bond issue of Toho Gas Company-Sakura is the main
bank of Toho Gas.275 Indeed, one high ranking officer of a Japanese tire
manufacturer stated, "[W]e don't want to upset our lead bank by turning
down underwriting proposals from its securities unit...,2 76 With the
increasing trend of turning to capital markets rather than debt financing
and the acceleration of asset securitization, it is likely that the keiretsu sys-
tem will weaken as Japanese companies have less need to rely on a main
bank to provide them with short-term credit. Nevertheless, for now, par-
ent banks' links to corporate Japan promise to be lucrative for their sub-
sidiaries. Although the securities subsidiaries may have an advantage due
to their parent banks' corporate ties, that, in itself, would not be sufficient
for the subsidiaries to grow and thrive. Sanwa Securities president
Toshiharu Ukegawa stated that the subsidiaries are expected to come up
270. Toshio Aritake, Finance Ministry Plans to Let Some Banks Passively Broker Stock
Trades, 64 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 201 (Jan. 23, 1995). In December 1993,
Yasushi Mieno, governor of the Bank ofJapan, said, " [d] eregulation can be seen as an
indispensable element in promoting greater activity in the Japanese economy." Two-
Way Openings, supra note 11, at 52.
271. Japan's Bankers Breach the Wall EcoNoMis-r, Nov. 26, 1994, at 85.
272. Linda Sieg, Japan's Top Banks Enter Securities Arena, The Reuter Asia-Pac. Bus.
Rep., Nov. 24, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File. A director in the
MOF's Securities Bureau attributes an 8.8% increase in corporate bond issues during
the first half of fiscal year 1994 to the operations of IBJ Securities, Norinchukin Securi-
ties, and LTCB Securities. The Big Bang, Japanese-Style, supra note 8, at 56.
273. City Banks' Securities Units Present Potential Power Shift: 5 New Subsidiaries Entering
Sector As Firms Step Up Securities-Related Financing, NIKKEi WIKL., Oct. 31, 1994, at 16
(statement by Minoru Suzuki, president of Sakura Securities Company).
274. Otsuka, supra note 251; Masayuki Kato, Tokyo Report: Underwriting Race Heats Up
Among Bank Units, Jji Press Ticker Service, Feb. 20, 1995, available in LEXIS, News
Library, CURNWS File; Ishibashi, supra note 212 (statement by Shuichi Shino, general
manager of Yamaichi's capital markets department).
275. Six More City Banks Establish Brokerage Subsidiaries in Japan, 63 Banking Rep.
(BNA) No. 21, at 847 (Dec. 5, 1994) ("[O]ther bank brokerages are poised to seize on
their main bank relationships with corporate clients ... for bond issues... ").
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with new ideas and good information services to serve their clients'
needs.2 77
Conclusion
The goal of the Japanese reform was to increase competition. Yet, the
MOF has introduced the reform in such a manner as to stifle competition
and protect vested interests, specifically those of the smaller securities
houses that rely on corporate stock trading for the main volume of their
business. The smaller securities firms are the most likely to suffer dire
consequences from the increased competition.2 78 But to the extent that
jobs are lost by the failure of the smaller securities firms, this is simply a
part of the natural process in a capitalistic system. Jobs displaced by mod-
ernization will allow people to seek jobs in areas of the economy where
they are more needed and more productive.2 79 The MOF could have mit-
igated the loss ofjobs in a less anticompetitive way-by allowing the banks
to purchase existing securities concerns. The solution the MOF adopts,
keeping the securities subsidiaries from operating in the equity markets, is
only temporary. If the small securities firms are going to suffer from the
increased competition of the banks' securities subsidiaries, it is unclear
why they will fare better under the competition with delayed entry. The
MOF is only postponing the inevitable.
The trend in both the United States and Japan is toward integration
of the commercial and investment banking business. 28 0 Removing the
barriers between them would bring both countries closer to the systems
maintained in all other industrial nations and help the United States and
Japan compete more effectively on an international level. While the large
securities houses have benefited from the reforms,2 81 the banks have
gained the most from the deregulation process.282 For any innovation in
the next few years in Japan, we should look to the securities industry first.
They have everything to lose and nothing to gain from relaxing the
restraints imposed by Article 65; they had been competing effectively in
the banks' traditional markets before the reform and stealing the banks'
traditional loan business as consumers increasingly turned to the capital
277. Otsuka, supra note 251.
278. Japan's Bankers Breach the Wall ECONOMIs-r, Nov. 26, 1994, at 85.
279. Financial Services Competitiveness Act of 1995, Hearing Before the House Banking and
Financial Serices Comm., 24-25 (Feb. 28, 1995) (statement by Alan Greenspan, Chairman
of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors), available in LEXIS, News Library,
CURNWS File.
280. As the Japanese begin implementating their weakened Article 65, the United
States appears to be re-examining the wisdom of maintaining the separation between its
banking and securities industries. See Tim Carrington, Glass-Steagall Act Targeted for Elim-
ination, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 1995, at A2.
281. Nomura Securities, Daiwa Securities, Nikko Securities, and Yamaichi Securities,
commonly known as the "Big Four," established trust banking subsidiaries in October,
1993. Two-Way Openings, supra note 11, at 55. These subsidiaries allow the securities
firms to engage in the foreign exchange business, and that is seen as a large advantage.
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markets for financing. The inroads the securities firms made into areas of
traditional banking business was in fact one of the primary motivations for
the reform.2 83 The securities industry has succeeded in convincing the
MOF to keep the pace of the reform slow, allowing the banks only gradual
access to the securities business. To combat the increased competition
and their perceived disadvantage, the securities firms will have a greater
incentive to innovate.
Frustrated with the degree of MOF control over the pace and sub-
stance of the reforms, critics have called the current financial reform a
"bonsai" liberalization.2 8 4 These critics argue that the MOF is unwilling to
allow competitive forces to reign in the Japanese financial system as they
do in Western financial systems.285 It is for this reason, the lack of "West-
ern-like" competition in the Japanese financial system, that the reform will
probably not have the desired effect of promoting innovation to any signif-
icant degree.
Critics of the reform accuse the MOF of fearing change.2 86 New
financial products and services created by Western banks and brokers are
not available for use in Japan until they are cleared with the MOF individu-
ally.287 By that time, of course, all players in the financial markets are
aware of the new instruments and know exactly how to use them, and
nobody gains a competitive advantage over anyone else. For the Japanese
to be more active in the creation of new and innovative financial products
and services, they must introduce more competition between the various
sectors of the financial markets than currently exists in their financial sys-
tem. While the Financial System Reform Law is certainly a step in the
right direction, it is really more of a half-step. Unfortunately, given the
framework in which the MOF is implementing the reform, it is unlikely
that we will see any real improvement for quite some time. The MOF said
in April 1993 that it would review the regulations in two or three years,288
and perhaps by then it will be convinced of the benefits of competition.
While some commentators are more optimistic about the reforms,28 9 it
will take time before the advantages of staged entry produce any real inno-
vation in the Japanese financial system.
283. See supra part II.B.3.
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